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1 Comcast Mem. Standard of Review (July 1, 2005); Framingham Mem. Standard of
Review (July 7, 2005); Framingham Supp. Mem. Standard of Review (July 25, 2005);
Comcast Supp. Mem. Standard of Review (July 25, 2005).
ORDER ON STANDARD OF REVIEW, ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE,
AND PARTIAL SUMMARY DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2005, Comcast of Massachusetts III, Inc. (“Comcast”) filed with the Cable
Television Division (“Cable Division”) of the Massachusetts Department of
Telecommunications and Energy, a petition of appeal, pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 14, from
the April 4, 2005, decision of the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Framingham
(“Framingham”) denying Comcast’s franchise renewal proposal.  This is a case of first
impression, as the Cable Division has not previously been asked to review a denial of a
franchise renewal.
The parties ask the Cable Division to determine, as an initial matter, what standard to
apply in reviewing Framingham’s denial of the franchise renewal proposal.1  This Order will
also address both parties’ motions to take administrative notice of various documents that are
part of the record of, or were excluded from evidence in, the franchise renewal proceedings
CTV 05-2 Page 2
2 Comcast Mot. Taking of Administrative Notice (May 4, 2005); Framingham Opp.
Comcast Mot. Taking of Administrative Notice and Framingham Mot. to Strike
(May 31, 2005); Framingham Mot. Taking of Administrative Notice (May 31, 2005);
Comcast Opp. Framingham Mot. to Strike (June 13, 2005).
3 Comcast Mot. and Mem. Summ. Decision (July 25, 2005); Framingham Mot. Summ.
Decision (July 25, 2005).  After the parties filed their motions for summary decision
and opposition to those motions, the parties each submitted their own Proposed
Decision and Order.  There is no provision for such filings under our procedural
regulations.  801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)(1).  The parties already had the opportunity to
brief the issues in their motions and oppositions.  The Cable Division strikes these
documents as redundant and improperly filed.  Proposed orders or other such
supplemental documents should not be submitted in the future in this proceeding unless
leave to do so is granted or as otherwise directed.
4 Comcast Pet. at 11; Framingham Answer at 6.
5 Comcast Pet. at 11; Framingham Answer at 6; JX.27, at 5:9–12.  Since the term of the
license was 5 years, no violation of state law occurred by the extensions.
before the Board of Selectmen.2  Finally, this Order will decide the parties’ cross-motions for
summary decision.3
II. BACKGROUND
After Comcast acquired AT&T Broadband by merger in 2002, Comcast applied for
Framingham’s approval of the transfer of control of the license, which was deemed approved
on or about July 16, 2002.4  The original term of the existing license expired on
March 23, 2003, but during renewal negotiations, Framingham and Comcast twice agreed to
extend the license in order to give the parties additional time to agree to the terms of a new
renewal license.5  On December 19, 2002, Framingham conducted an ascertainment hearing to
identify future cable-related community needs and interests and to review the performance of
CTV 05-2 Page 3
6 Comcast Pet. at 11; Framingham Answer at 6.
7 Comcast Pet. at 12; Framingham Answer at 6.
8 Comcast Pet. at 12; Framingham Answer at 6.  Because neither party’s motion for
summary decision relied upon Comcast’s purported amendment, this Order does not
address the substance of the amendment.
9 Comcast Pet. at 12; Framingham Answer at 6.
10 Comcast Pet. at 12; Framingham Answer at 6.
11 Comcast Pet. at 12.
AT&T Broadband under its current license.6  On September 24, 2003, Framingham issued a
request for proposal (“RFP”) that sought information and a renewal proposal from Comcast on
or before October 24, 2003.7
There is a dispute whether Comcast, on October 23, 2003, reserved the right to make
further revisions or amendments to its proposal, which it submitted to Framingham on
October 24, 2003.8  Although the parties initiated the formal renewal process, the parties also
engaged in informal negotiations thereafter.9  There is also a dispute whether during
negotiations Framingham produced certain data for the first time in support of its claimed
cable-related needs, and whether this data was part of Framingham’s ascertainment and
available to Comcast before the deadline for submitting its proposal.10  Comcast submitted a
purported amendment to its renewal proposal, which was dated March 8, 2004.11  Framingham
counters that its RFP did not provide for the right to submit an amendment and alleges that the
CTV 05-2 Page 4
12 Framingham Answer at 62.  As we discuss below, Comcast concedes that the
amendment was not submitted until March 10, 2004.
13 Comcast Pet. at 13; Framingham Answer at 8.
14 Framingham Answer at 7; Joint Exh. Vol. I, tab A (Mem. on Hearing Process
(Oct. 20, 2004)); see also Comcast Pet. at 13.
15 Comcast Pet. at 13; Framingham Answer at 8.
amendment actually was filed after Framingham issued a Preliminary Assessment of Denial on
March 9, 2004.12
Framingham conducted ten days of hearings on Comcast’s renewal proposal between
October 26, 2004 and March 7, 2005.13  Prior to the hearings, the parties agreed that those
hearings would be governed by an informal process, and would not be governed by the
Massachusetts Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) or the Massachusetts Rules of Court.14 
On or about April 4, 2005, Framingham issued the “Administrative Proceeding Decision of the
Framingham Board of Selectmen, As Issuing Authority” (“Framingham Decision”), which sets
forth 22 reasons for its denial of Comcast’s Renewal Proposal.15
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Introduction
There are two aspects of the standard of review that we must consider in this
proceeding.  The first pertains to the procedural stance of this case.  Comcast’s petition is
before us on “appeal,” pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 14, from the decision of Framingham to
deny the franchise renewal proposal.  The question before the Cable Division is whether we
must give deference to Framingham’s findings of fact as traditionally accorded by the courts to
CTV 05-2 Page 5
16 Although the parties address these issues in their motions for summary decision, we
discuss them separately here in order to highlight the proper standard of review to be
applied for the remainder of this proceeding.  We will rule on issues of law where
partial summary decision is appropriate and issue determinations of fact where there is
no genuine dispute of material facts.
administrative determinations or whether we must review those findings de novo.  The second
pertains to the law applicable to our review of the record compiled from the Framingham
hearings and, if review is to be conducted de novo, of the record from additional evidence
presented to the Cable Division.  The parties agree that Section 626 of the Cable Act is
relevant to our review, but they disagree over its application.  These disagreements involve
whether in reviewing a renewal proposal a franchising authority must consider the
reasonableness of the proposal as a whole or whether the entire proposal may be rejected for
unreasonable failure to meet any single identified community need; whether Section 626
requires consideration of amended or alternate proposals presented in response to negotiations;
and whether certain evidence is relevant to the review of the renewal proposal, such as the
effect of cable service competition within the community and the effect of the cost of proposed
franchise concessions upon rates.16
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17 Comcast Mem. Standard of Review at 1.
18 Id. at 10.
19 Id. at 11.
B. De Novo Review
1. Positions of the Parties
a. Comcast
Comcast argues that the Cable Division’s review of the Framingham Decision is
governed entirely by a de novo standard of review.17  Comcast relies upon MediaOne v. Board
of Selectmen of North Andover, CTV 99-2, 99-3, 99-4, 99-5, Order on Motions for Summary
Decision/Consolidation (2000) (“MediaOne”), in which the Cable Division found that
G.L. c. 166A, § 19 requires the Cable Division to conduct a Section 14 proceeding pursuant to
Chapter 30A, and that we must review the issuing authority’s decision de novo, because the
proceeding is the first proceeding to be conducted under Chapter 30A.18  Comcast reasons that
because the parties specifically agreed that the Framingham proceedings would not be
governed by Chapter 30A, the same rationale in MediaOne applies, and the Cable Division is
obligated to investigate and evaluate the renewal proposal de novo.19  Comcast maintains that
the exception contained in G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which provides that many of the procedural
protections of G.L. c. 30A, § 11 do not apply to an appeal when a party has the opportunity to
obtain an agency hearing followed by appeals before the same or different agencies, does not
CTV 05-2 Page 7
20 Id. at 12, citing Konstantopoulos v. Whatley, 384 Mass 123, 134 (1981).
21 Id. at 13.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 13–14.
apply to this case, because Comcast has not yet had a Chapter 30A hearing, and because the
Board of Selectmen is not an “agency.”20
Comcast argues that the use of the terms “appeal” and “review” in statutes expressly
providing for state agency review of local board decisions does not preclude the agency from
conducting a de novo review of the decision.21  Comcast notes that the Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) in Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339,
369–70 (1973), rejected the plaintiff municipal boards’ argument that the use of those words in
the relevant appeals statute indicated that a de novo hearing was not intended and held that the
Housing Appeals Committee (“HAC”) was obligated to make its own decision on the basis of a
new evidentiary hearing because the statute required it to find facts, draw conclusions, and
state its own reasons for its decision.22  Comcast also relies upon United Food Corp. v.
Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 375 Mass. 238, 240 (1978), for the proposition that
statutes providing for hearing requirements in administrative appeals of local decisions reflect
legislative intent that a state agency develop its own record on appeal.23  Comcast states that in
United Food Corp., the SJC noted that Chapter 30A “affords a fresh hearing” on appeals to
the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (“ABCC”) from local licensing board
CTV 05-2 Page 8
24 Id.
25 Id. at 14.
26 Id. at 14–15, citing AT&T v. Board of Selectmen of Westford, CTV 02-5,
Interlocutory Order on Motions for Summary Decision at 5 (Sept. 18, 2002).
27 Id. at 15.
28 Id. at 15 n.3, citing Hanover, 363 Mass. at 370–71.
29 Id.
decisions.24  Comcast therefore argues that the Cable Division must hold a hearing in which
Comcast is permitted to introduce evidence that was not before the Board of Selectmen and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.25
Comcast responds to concerns that conducting a de novo hearing may unfairly allow a
cable operator to have a “second bite of the apple” to make its case.26  Comcast argues that this
concern is not applicable here, because Comcast has not yet had a “full and fair hearing
conducted pursuant to Chapter 30A.”27  Comcast also notes that the SJC considered and
rejected the argument that a de novo hearing before the HAC would permit an applicant to
make a purely pro forma presentation to the local board, because “[a]n applicant would be
unlikely to choose an approach that would require two presentations, with added costs and
delays, where one presentation could suffice.”28  Comcast asserts that it attempted to make a
full and complete presentation to the Board of Selectmen, but that the Board refused to hear
evidence that Comcast now seeks to present to the Cable Division.29
Finally, Comcast maintains that the principles of de novo review in the judicial system
also apply to the Cable Division’s review of this case.  Comcast states that conclusions on pure
CTV 05-2 Page 9
30 Id. at 6, citing Gonzales v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 2002).
31 Id. at 6–7, citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996);
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
32 Id. at 7.
or nearly pure questions of law are judged in virtually all appeals on a de novo standard.30 
Comcast contends that de novo judicial review is appropriate when necessary to maintain
control of, and to clarify the legal principles expounded upon by the appellate reviewer.31 
Comcast argues that because the Cable Division is the ultimate authority for licensing matters
in Massachusetts, it has a policy reason, in addition to its statutory obligations, to review all
elements of Comcast’s appeal de novo.32
CTV 05-2 Page 10
33 Framingham Mem. Standard of Review at 1, citing 47 U.S.C. § 546;
G.L. c. 166A, § 14.  Framingham describes the appropriate standard of review in this
proceeding variously as a “substantial evidence” or an “arbitrary or unreasonable”
standard (Framingham Supp. Mem. Standard of Review at 5); an “arbitrary or
capricious” standard (id. at 1–2, 5.); an “unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or
arbitrary” standard (id. at 6); a due process test balancing the “individual interest at
stake and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty or property” (Framingham
Mem. Standard of Review at 13); a due process test based on the procedural
requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 546, G.L. c. 166A, § 14, and G.L. c. 30A, § 11
(Framingham Mem. Standard of Review at 16); a review for “bias or inappropriate
influence” (id. at 11); a review of the issuing authority’s exercise of “discretion”
(Framingham Supp. Mem. Standard of Review at 5); a review whether the issuing
authority’s decision was based on a “legally untenable ground” (id. at 6); or a “review
based upon the record” (Framingham Mem. Standard of Review at 18; Framingham
Supp. Mem. Standard of Review at 6).  While Framingham does not settle upon any
single standard to apply, we discern that Framingham argues that we should apply some
standard of review, other than de novo review, limited to the record of the proceedings
before Framingham.
34 Id. at 5.
b. Framingham
Framingham argues that the proper standard of review is a review based solely on the
record of the administrative proceedings before Framingham.33  Specifically, Framingham
argues that Section 626 of the Cable Act states that review by the court is to be “based on the
record of the proceedings conducted under subsection (c) of this section” and that subsection
(c) refers to a proceeding conducted before the “franchising authority.”34    Framingham
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35 Id. at 6-9, citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 19, 23–27 (1984); Town of Norwood v.
Adams-Russell Co., Inc., 406 Mass. 604, 608 n.6 (1990); Final Report of the Special
Commission Established for the Purpose of Making and Investigation and Study Related
to the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Existing Licensing and Regulations of the Cable
Television Operation by Municipalities and the Commonwealth, Joint Committee on
Government Regulations (Dec. 30, 2003).
36 Id. at 11, citing Rolla Cable, 745 F.Supp. at 578.
37 Id. at 5 n.2.
38 Id. at 10.
39 Id. at 11–12, citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 75.
argues that under the Cable Act the local municipality is the franchising authority.35 
Framingham suggests that a reviewing body may go outside of the record on appeal only if
there is a strong indication that the due process rights of the cable operator have been
violated.36  Framingham reasons that while Section 626(e) pertains to judicial review of a
franchising decision rather than agency review of such a decision, the section is relevant to this
proceeding, because if a court may not conduct a de novo review, then the state’s
administrative review also must be limited to a review of the record, absent express statutory
support to the contrary.37  Framingham asserts that the standard of review has been defined by
federal law, and therefore, the Cable Division is preempted from establishing a different
standard of review.38
Moreover, Framingham notes that the legislative history of the Cable Act recognized
that the decision of a municipal franchising authority may be subject to “review” or “approval”
by the state.39  Framingham argues that the use of such terms is evidence that Congress
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intended state authorities to perform a review of the decision based on the record and
determine whether to approve the decision, not to complete a de novo review.40
Framingham argues that under state law, the Cable Division’s function is limited to a
review of the action of the issuing authority and either “approval” or “disapproval” of the
action.41  Framingham contends that this language clearly indicates that the Cable Division
does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review.42  Framingham argues that the
Cable Division cannot supplant its decision for that of the Board of Selectmen, because the
Cable Division has no authority to order that a license be issued.43
2. Analysis
a. No Federal Preemption of De Novo Review by State Agency
The Cable Division finds unpersuasive Framingham’s argument that Section 626(e) of
the Cable Act preempts the Cable Division from reviewing the Framingham Decision de novo. 
Section 626(e)(2)(B) provides that a reviewing court may grant relief if the court finds that a
denial is “not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the record of the
proceeding conducted [by the franchising authority] under subsection (c).”  As Framingham
admits, Section 626(e) pertains to judicial review of a final decision of a franchising authority. 
Nothing in the plain language of this provision expressly preempts de novo review of a
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44 Framingham’s reliance upon Board of Appeals of Hanover, 363 Mass. at 369, in
construing the meaning of “review” or “approval” is unavailing (Framingham Mem.
Standard of Review at 12).  That case in fact held that the relevant statute did require a
de novo proceeding.  363 Mass. at 369.  Just as in Board of Appeals of Hanover, the
relevant statutes do not merely require review and approval or disapproval, but require
the Cable Division to conduct an adjudicatory proceeding in compliance with the
procedural requirements of Chapter 30A.  G.L. c. 166A, § 19; G.L. c. 30A, § 11.
45 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
46 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
franchising authority’s decision by a state agency.  In fact, Section 626(f) provides that a
decision of the franchising authority is not final “unless all administrative review by the State
has occurred or the opportunity therefor has lapsed.”  We are not convinced that Congress, in
discussing the possibility of further state administrative review under Section 626(f), intended
to limit such review to the local franchising authority’s record by using the terms “review” or
“approval” in the legislative history describing such further administrative proceedings.44 
Further, because the findings and determinations of the Framingham Decision are not final and
thus are not ripe for judicial review, Section 626(e) is not applicable.
Absent express preemption, state action may be preempted if it conflicts with federal
law.  Conflict preemption “occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible,”45 or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”46  Congress’s recognition that some state statutes
subject municipal franchising decisions to “review, or perhaps formal approval, by the state,”
demonstrates that de novo review would not frustrate Congress’ purposes in assuring that cable
systems are “responsive to the needs and interests of the local community.”
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The requirement under Section 626(c) that a franchising authority must issue a written
decision based upon the record of the proceeding before it is simply an axiom of procedural
due process.  It does not, however, demonstrate that de novo review under G.L. c. 166A, § 14
would result in any conflict as Framingham asserts.47  It does not preclude the evidentiary
record of the franchising authority or its written decision from being modified upon
administrative review.  If the Cable Division approves of Framingham’s action, the
Cable Division “shall issue notice to [Framingham] to that effect.”48  In such case,
Framingham’s decision would be final and appealable to the federal district court.  If the Cable
Division disapproves of Framingham’s action, the result would be a written decision issued to
Framingham and a remand order to Framingham to conform with the decision.49  If any appeal
is to be taken to the federal district court after the parties have exhausted their state
administrative remedies, the record would include Framingham’s record on remand and the
record of this proceeding.  Accordingly, we find that Section 626 of the Cable Act does not
preempt the Cable Division from reviewing the Framingham Decision de novo.
b. De Novo Review Required Under Chapter 30A
Finding that federal law does not preempt de novo review by a state agency does not
end the inquiry.  We must consider the mode of review required by G.L.c. 166A, §§ 14, 19,
and G.L. c. 30A, of an issuing authority’s franchising decision made pursuant to
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G.L. c. 166A, § 13.  The Cable Division has stated in the context of reviewing an action of an
issuing authority denying consent to the transfer of a license, that because transfer hearings
held by an issuing authority are exempt from the procedures required by Chapter 30A,
aggrieved parties that appeal to the Cable Division pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 14 have not
been entitled to the protections of Chapter 30A, and that accordingly, the Cable Division is
obligated to hear such appeals de novo.50  Franchise renewal proceedings before the issuing
authority similarly are exempt from the procedural requirements of Chapter 30A.51   In any
event, the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Framingham is not an “agency” subject to
Chapter 30A.52
Framingham cites to the Community Antenna Television Commission’s (predecessor of
the Cable Division) prior interpretation of G.L. c. 166A, § 14, limiting review to whether a
local board’s conclusions are based on substantial evidence, and in the case of license transfer
proceedings whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious.53  In MediaOne, however, the
Cable Division expressly ruled that this interpretation of G.L. c. 166A, § 14 was in error and
that our review is not confined to the record below.54
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56 General Laws c. 138, § 67 provides: “If the commission approves the action of the
local licensing authorities it shall issue notice to them to that effect, but if the
commission disapproves of their action it shall issue a decision in writing advising said
local authorities of the reasons why it does not approve, and shall then remand the
matter to the said local authorities for further action. The commission shall not in any
event order a license to be issued to any applicant except after said applicant's
application for license has first been granted by the local authorities.”
57 Webster v. Board of Appeals of Reading, 349 Mass. 17, 19 (1965).
58 Because the Cable Division’s review of the Framingham Decision is de novo, it is
unnecessary to rule on Comcast’s allegations of procedural errors during the
Framingham administrative hearings.  We similarly decline to rule on Framingham’s
request for a ruling that there was no impropriety in the Board of Selectmen acting as
presiding officer in the proceedings before it, because the question is not necessary to
the disposition of this proceeding.  Cf. Framingham Mem. Summ. Decision at 57.
Moreover, the Cable Division is persuaded that United Food Corp., and the body of
precedent regarding appeals to the ABCC, support a ruling that G.L. c. 166A, § 14 affords a
“fresh hearing” under Chapter 30A.55  General Laws c. 166A, § 14 is parallel in construction
to the statute applicable to appeals before the ABCC, G.L. c. 138, § 67.56  “Sound principles
of statutory construction dictate that interpretation of provisions having identical language be
uniform.”57  Proceedings before the ABCC reviewing local licensing decisions are de novo. 
Therefore, the Cable Division determines that our review of an action by an issuing authority
denying renewal of a license must be de novo pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 14.58
C. Application of Section 626 (47 U.S.C. § 546)
1. Statutory Framework
We turn now to the substantive standard to be applied in our de novo review.  Under
Section 626 of the Cable Act, if a franchising authority has issued a preliminary assessment
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that the cable operator’s franchise should not be renewed, the cable operator may request that
the franchising authority commence an administrative proceeding to consider whether
(A) the cable operator has substantially complied with the material terms
of the existing franchise and with applicable law;
(B) the quality of the operator’s service, including signal quality,
response to consumer complaints, and billing practices, but without regard to
the mix or quality of cable services or other services provided over the system,
has been reasonable in light of community needs;
(C) the operator has the financial, legal, and technical ability to provide
the services, facilities, and equipment as set forth in the operator’s proposal; and
(D) the operator’s proposal is reasonable to meet the future cable-related
community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of meeting such
needs and interests.59
The first three factors are not raised in this proceeding, because Framingham’s written decision
to deny the proposal is based only upon its finding that the proposal was not reasonable to meet
the future cable-related community needs and interests.60  We review the parties’ arguments
with respect to Section 626(c)(1)(D) below.
2. Balancing Local Needs Against Cost
a. Positions of the Parties
Framingham maintains that while an issuing authority customarily determines local
needs through the use of public hearings, surveys, focus groups, interviews, terms provided in
past agreements, and “its own knowledge and experience in its day to day interaction with the
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local community,” it is not required to use all of the foregoing methods.61  Rather,
Framingham argues that it is best able to determine the community’s cable-related needs and
interests, and that limited, deferential review of its franchising decision is consistent with the
Cable Act’s purposes in assuring that cable systems are responsible to the needs of the local
community.62  Framingham argues that no statute or case law precisely defines how
Framingham must determine local needs, and that review of local ascertainment is limited.63
Framingham states that it determined local needs based on an ascertainment hearing,
comments received from the public, the Board of Selectmen’s own experience and in-depth
knowledge of the community, and review and identification of the terms and conditions in the
existing franchise agreement that were beneficial to the community.64  Framingham argues that
Comcast had the burden to provide it with reasonable estimates of the costs for each of the
proposed needs, and that it was also Comcast’s burden to establish that the cost of the services
“was so onerous to Comcast that such costs outweighed the value of the services to the
Town.”65
Comcast counters that Congress intended to limit demands that are not justified by
community need and by cost, in order to protect the cable operator’s investment in the
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at 25.
67 Id., citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 72
68 Id. at 9, citing 47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(d).
69 47 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1).
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system.66  Comcast argues that the governing standard is one of “reasonableness,” and that the
standards and procedures of the Cable Act are intended to preclude the franchising authority
from making demands for “unreasonable requirements.67  Comcast thus argues that its proposal
is entitled to be renewed if it is “reasonable to meet the community needs and interests, taking
into account the cost of meeting such needs and interests.”68
b. Analysis
The formal renewal process is a two-stage process.  The first stage involves an
“ascertainment” proceeding undertaken by the franchising authority to afford the public notice
and participation for the purpose of “identifying the future cable-related community needs and
interests” and reviewing the cable operator’s performance under the current franchise.69  At the
conclusion of, and not prior to, the ascertainment proceedings, the issuing authority may
require the cable operator to submit a proposal for renewal, in the form of an RFP, which sets
forth the town’s identified cable-related needs and interests and specifies, subject to the
limitations of Section 624, the information and proposals to be submitted.70  The second stage
involves the issuing authority’s review of a proposal.  If the issuing authority issues a
preliminary assessment of denial, the issuing authority may conduct an administrative hearing
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affording the parties the opportunity to submit evidence on the community’s cable-related
needs and interests and costs of meeting those needs and interests.71  At the completion of the
second proceeding, the franchising authority is required to issue a written decision granting or
denying the proposal based upon the record of the second proceeding.72
Whether Framingham properly ascertained its cable-related needs and interests is not
before us.  Pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 14, a cable operator that is aggrieved by an issuing
authority’s denial of its application for renewal of a license may appeal to the Cable Division
from the issuing authority’s denial of the application.  This is not an appeal from the
ascertainment stage, but rather, from the second stage of the formal renewal process.
The second stage entails a review of whether, given the issuing authority’s identified
cable-related needs and interests (subject to Section 624), the cable operator has demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposal is reasonable, taking into account the cost
of meeting those needs and interests.  The burden of proof is on the cable operator to
demonstrate that its proposal is reasonable.  Because Section 626(c)(1)(D) applies a balancing
test of costs against needs, the cable operator must also demonstrate the cost of meeting the
ascertained needs and interests.  Evidence of the community’s cable-related needs and interests
that was introduced in the ascertainment proceeding “shall for the purposes of the
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76 Framingham Mem. Summ. Decision at 50, citing Marr v. Back Bay Architectural
Commission, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 684 (1987); MacGibbon v. Issuing Authority of
Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 519 (1976); Roberts v. Southwestern Bell Mobile
Systems, Inc., 429 Mass. 478, 486 (1999); Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 461
(2003); Union CATV, Inc. v. City of Sturgis, 107 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 1997).
administrative proceeding be regarded no differently than any other evidence.”73  The cable
operator’s “ability to earn a fair rate of return on its investment and the impact of such costs on
subscriber rates” are considerations in evaluating costs.74  Finally, given the level of subscriber
interest in the identified cable-related needs and interests, the cable operator must show that it
is not in the community’s interests to receive such facilities and services in view of the costs,
and that therefore its renewal proposal is reasonable.75
3. Whether the Proposal Must Be Considered as a Whole
a. Positions of the Parties
(1) Framingham
Framingham contends that if a decision of an Issuing authority is based on
considerations that in and of themselves would not furnish a legally tenable ground for denial,
such improper considerations do not invalidate the decision if it is based on any legally tenable
ground and is not unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.76  Thus, Framingham
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argues that if any of the 22 reasons stated in the Framingham Decision are found to be
justified, then the decision must be upheld.77
(2) Comcast
Comcast maintains that the standard is “reasonableness” to “protect cable operators
against unfair denials of renewals,” and does not permit the Town’s “letter-perfect” standard.78 
Comcast states that the Cable Division has recognized that the federal standards and processes
for renewal of a cable license create a presumption of renewal.79  Comcast argues that
Congress intended to limit demands that are not justified by community need and by cost, and
preclude the franchising authority from making demands for “unreasonable requirements.”80 
Comcast argues that in discussing the “reasonableness” of a proposal, Congress stated, “[I]t is
not intended that this criteria requires the operator to respond to every person or group that
expresses an interest in any particular capability or service.”81  Comcast argues that this
passage means that a cable operator need not meet every need or interest identified by the
Town, so long as the proposal as a whole is “reasonable to meet the community needs and
interests, taking into account the cost of meeting such needs and interests.”82  Comcast argues
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for such a reading of the standard, because the statute does not specify that “each element” of a
proposal is to be reviewed for reasonableness, but rather, the statute discusses “needs and
interests” in the conjunctive sense.  Further, Comcast argues that the “cost” at issue is the
“cost of meeting such needs and interests” as a whole, not the cost of each requirement in a
vacuum, although Comcast concedes that it is useful to understand the cost of certain elements
that may be quantified.83
Comcast contends that the court decisions to which Framingham cites are not relevant
to cable television licensing under federal or state laws applicable to Massachusetts.84  Further,
Comcast contends that Framingham misreads Sturgis, because the court rejected Framingham’s
argument, holding that its “task is not limited solely to deciding whether the operator’s
proposal, in fact, met all the cable-related needs and interests identified” but rather whether the
“operator has demonstrated that its proposal is ‘reasonable’ despite its failure to meet certain
identified community needs and interests.”85
b. Analysis
The question that the parties ask us to consider is whether we must consider Comcast’s
renewal proposal as a whole in determining whether it was proper to reject the proposal, or
whether the failure by Comcast to meet any single identified cable-related community need or
interest is a sufficient ground for rejecting the entire proposal.  With the exception of the
CTV 05-2 Page 24
86 We are not convinced that Sturgis answers the question before us, because that case
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logically support its contention that we must uphold the decision if only one ground for
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United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Sturgis,86 none of the cases to which
Framingham cites are relevant to this question.  The cases cited refer to the judicial standard of
review of administrative decisions standing for the principle that the fact that a board has relied
upon a legally untenable ground does not invalidate the decision if the board had a legally
tenable ground for the decision.  The cases do not answer the question whether the treatment of
every single identified need may be the basis of a separate “ground” for a decision under
47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(D).
We begin with an analysis of the language of 47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(D).  The plain
language of the statute provides that the applicable standard is one of “reasonableness.”  We
agree with Comcast that the statute directs us to consider “needs and interests” in the
conjunctive sense in considering whether the proposal is reasonable.  This interpretation is
consistent with the legislative history, in which Congress stated that the standard
does not mean that the operator must demonstrate that each factual element
which led the franchise authority to make an adverse finding with regard to one
of the considerations (A) through (D) is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, but the operator must make such a demonstration with regard to an
adverse finding on each of the standards asserted by the franchising authority as
a basis for denial, in order for the court to grant relief.87
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as to make the entire proposal unreasonable, but Framingham does not make that
argument here, and no facts supporting such a finding have been alleged in this case.
That is, Comcast must demonstrate in this proceeding that the preponderance of the evidence
does not support Framingham’s finding that Comcast’s entire proposal was not reasonable to
meet the future cable-related community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of
meeting such needs and interests, rather than demonstrate that Framingham’s findings with
respect to each element of the proposal found to be unreasonable were not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, we reject Framingham’s argument that the Framingham
Decision must be upheld if even only one of its findings with respect to the proposed terms is
sustainable.88
We also find that the clause, “taking into account the cost of meeting such needs and
interests” modifies the reasonableness test such that the cost is one factor in determining
reasonableness.  While we find that the appropriate standard requires us to consider the
reasonableness of the proposal as a whole, and not simply to review each factual element
independently, we are not, however, convinced that this clause clearly establishes that we are
limited to evaluating the “cost” of meeting all cable-related community needs as a whole,
rather than reviewing the cost of each identified need or interest.  The legislative history
suggests that we are to assess the cost of each need and interest:
[I]n assessing the costs under this criteria, the cable operator’s ability to earn a
fair rate of return on its investment and the impact of such costs on subscriber
rates are important considerations.  Finally, it is not intended that this criteria
requires the operator to respond to every person or group that expresses an
interest in any particular capability or service.  Rather, the operator’s
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responsibility is to provide those facilities and services which can be shown to
be in the interests of the community to receive in view of the costs thereof.89
That is, an operator need not meet a particular interest if a particular capability or service
cannot be shown to be in the interests of the community given the effect of the cost on
subscriber rates or if the operator cannot earn a fair rate of return as a result of the cost.  Thus,
we must assess the cost of each need and interest as a factor in determining whether the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates whether or not the proposal as a whole is
reasonable.
4. Whether the Proposal May Be Amended
a. Positions of the Parties
(1) Framingham
Framingham argues that Comcast did not have the unilateral right to amend its renewal
proposal.  Framingham states that the RFP provided an explicit deadline for submitting a
renewal proposal, and there was no provision for filing documents related to the RFP
responses or an amendment later than October 24, 2003.90  Framingham argues that Comcast’s
position that it may submit an amendment to a formal renewal proposal at any time after the
deadline contradicts the statutory provision that “[t]he franchising authority may establish a
date by which such proposal shall be submitted.”91  Framingham also argues that the language
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Comcast Opp. Framingham Mot. Summ. Decision at 55.
96 Framingham Mem. Summ. Decision at 49.
of 47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) unambiguously gives it a full 120 days to make a decision regarding
a formal renewal proposal.92  Framingham argues that Comcast’s position could leave it in a
situation where it has one or two days to consider a substantially changed renewal proposal in
order to meet the statutory deadline.93
Moreover, Framingham contends that Comcast did not dispute the RFP deadline and
did not “reserve the right to amend” the proposal when it submitted its formal renewal
proposal.94  Framingham also contends that the purported amendment was submitted to
Framingham, not on March 8, 2004, as Comcast claims, but not until March 10, 2004, after it
had already issued a preliminary denial of the proposal on March 9, 2004.95
Framingham disputes Comcast’s interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1), providing that
an operator may submit a proposal for renewal “on its own initiative.”96  Framingham points
out that 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) provides:
Upon completion of a proceeding under subsection (a), a cable operator seeking
renewal of a franchise may, on its own initiative or at the request of a
franchising authority, submit a proposal for renewal.
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Framingham states that it sent an RFP to Comcast first, and Comcast submitted a renewal
proposal pursuant to the RFP.97  Framingham maintains that 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) refers to
one renewal proposal being submitted at the end of the subsection (a)(1) proceedings, and that
Comcast submitted that renewal proposal.98  Framingham contends that no rational reading of
47 U.S.C. § 546 gives Comcast the right to submit multiple subsequent renewal proposals at
any point that it decides to do so.99
Finally, Framingham disputes the validity of Comcast’s rationale for submitting the
purported amendment.  Although Comcast argues that it submitted the amendment because it
learned of additional facts during informal negotiations with the Town, Framingham maintains
that the purpose of informal negotiations is to encourage a frank and candid exchange of views
and proposals between parties, “unencumbered by the possibility that a cable operator will use
the process for ‘free discovery’ to then facilitate subsequent amendment of the operator’s
formal proposal.”100  Framingham argues that permitting Comcast to submit a late filing will
“impermissibly blur the distinction” between the formal process and informal negotiations to
the detriment of both cable operators and issuing authorities.101
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(2) Comcast
Comcast responds that the Cable Division should take into account Comcast’s amended
proposal.102  Comcast maintains that after it submitted its initial proposal in October 2003,
Framingham presented it with additional information not presented during the ascertainment
process.103  Comcast asserts that this information received for the first time detailed
information concerning the need for funding for access studio equipment and schools.104 
Comcast contends that the amended proposal did not make substantial changes but would
increase the value by $195,000.105
Comcast counters Framingham’s argument regarding the deadline set for submitting a
response to the RFP, arguing that the RFP itself contemplates amendments to the proposal. 
Comcast points out that the RFP states that the “four-month negotiation period, mandated by
Section 626(c)(1) . . . will commence on October 24, 2003.”106  Comcast maintains that this
negotiation period is necessary because the RFP requires that certain details be determined
through negotiations, such as the length of the license term.107  Moreover, Comcast states that
the RFP provides that Framingham “reserves the right to discuss such additional/or more
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specific services and community needs during negotiations with Comcast,” and that “if
agreement is reached, the Issuing authority will have a renewal license drafted, the contents of
which will be based on the agreements made during negotiations, as well as on the proposals
and commitments contained in the renewal proposal.”108  Comcast argues that it could not have
possibly addressed or satisfied all of Framingham’s needs when it did not disclose all of its
specific needs in the RFP.109
Comcast argues that while 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(3) provides that “the franchising
authority may establish a date by which such proposal shall be submitted,” Framingham
waived any rights allegedly created by that section by leaving components of the RFP open for
further negotiation.110  Comcast argues that Framingham has not claimed that it has been
prejudiced by Comcast’s amended proposal, which was submitted on March 10, 2004.111 
Comcast maintains that Framingham had six months to assess the amendment, before
Framingham held any hearing in the matter, and one year before Framingham issued its final
decision.112
Comcast claims that nowhere in 47 U.S.C. § 546 is a cable operator limited to a single
proposal in response to an RFP.  Comcast highlights that the statute provides that “a cable
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operator . . . may, on its own initiative or at the request of a franchising authority, submit a
proposal for renewal.”113  Comcast asserts that the plain language of the statute gives Comcast
a right to submit a proposal on its own initiative, and that the only restriction placed upon the
cable operator is that the proposal cannot be submitted before the completion of the
ascertainment process.114
Finally, Comcast contends that Framingham has not provided evidence of harm that
would arise from accepting the amended proposal that would “blur the distinction between the
formal process and informal negotiation process to the detriment of cable operators and issuing
authorities throughout the Commonwealth.”115  Comcast cites to our own review of the
requirements of Form 100 for the proposition that it may amend its franchise renewal proposal
during formal proceedings.
b. Analysis
While the formal renewal process of Section 626 of the Cable Act is not mandatory,116
once a party has invoked the procedural protections of the process, the timetable and deadlines
established in Section 626 must be satisfied.  In this matter, the question of when a proposal
may be submitted is raised.  Where a municipality has issued an RFP, as Framingham did, the
RFP should establish the deadline for submissions.  There is no question that Comcast filed a
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timely proposal in response to the RFP.  The question is whether Comcast could later amend
that proposal.
Comcast claims that it sought to amend its proposal to address community needs with
respect to access studio equipment and schools not identified by Framingham until after
Framingham had issued its RFP.  Under the formal renewal process, a renewal proposal may
be filed, or may be required to be filed, upon completion of the ascertainment phase.117  
Significantly, the franchising authority may not require the cable operator to submit a proposal
prior to the completion of this first stage of the process.118  In this way, the cable operator is
protected from denial of a renewal license based on its failure to meet a community need or
interest of which it was not aware.  While Comcast contends that it proposed to increase the
value of its proposal in response to later presented needs, if these needs were not identified
when the ascertainment stage was complete, Comcast was not required to address them as part
of its formal renewal proposal or to amend its proposal to do so.  Similarly, the RFP leaves
certain terms open for negotiation and purportedly reserves to Framingham the right to
“discuss” additional terms to be incorporated in a final renewal license.  Thus, with respect to
these terms, Framingham does not identify any specific need or interest that Comcast was
obligated to address in its formal renewal proposal.  Since these needs and interests were not
identified, Framingham cannot find that Comcast’s proposals regarding these terms are
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unreasonable and, therefore, cannot base its denial on Comcast’s failure to meet these
previously unidentified needs.
The formal renewal process also protects municipalities.  As an initial matter,
Section 626 contemplates a finite process of renewal, a three-year period often referred to as
the “renewal window.”  Further, Section 626 provides a 120-day period during which a
municipality may review a proposal.119  If an operator were permitted continually to amend a
proposal, the overall statutory scheme could be frustrated.  The language of Section 626 does
not contemplate the filing of amended formal proposals.  Subsection (b)(1) speaks of the filing
of a proposal in the singular.  The clause, “on its own initiative or at the request of a
franchising authority,” modifies “may.”  It does not create the opportunity to submit more than
“a” proposal for renewal.  Sound policy also dictates a finding that a cable operator may not
unilaterally amend its formal proposal.  A contrary finding would shift the balance of interests
unduly in the cable operator’s favor.  A cable operator could “float” its most conservative
proposal, and, if it were not well received, modify it.  Cable operators are not permitted to
game the process in this manner.
Comcast in support of its position that it is permitted to amend its formal proposal
refers to a statement by the Cable Division in CTV 03-3.  There, the Cable Division
recognized, but in no way condoned, the practice of many cable operators and municipal
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consultants to continue informal negotiations even after the formal process has been invoked. 
In CTV 03-3, municipalities in particular raised concerns that they not lose their ability to
continue such negotiations.  Our statement that an operator may revise its proposal during the
course of negotiations referred to the fact that if the parties continue negotiations, the cable
operator is not bound to the formal proposal, but may offer terms in response to negotiations. 
Those revised terms, however, are not part of the formal renewal process of Section 626 and
affect neither the relevant deadlines nor the formal renewal proposal under review.
Accordingly, we grant Framingham’s motion in part and hold that Comcast was not
permitted to amend its formal renewal proposal in this instance.  Therefore, in this proceeding
we will consider whether the proposal that Comcast submitted on October 24, 2003, is
reasonable to meet Framingham’s needs and interests identified in its RFP issued on
September 24, 2003.
5. Effects of Competition
a. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast argues that, as a matter of law, Framingham should have considered evidence
regarding Comcast’s competition in Framingham in the proceedings before it.120  Comcast
maintains that Congress instructed that “in assessing the costs under [47 U.S.C.
§ 546(c)(1)(D)], the cable operator’s ability to earn a fair rate of return on its investment and
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the impact of such costs on subscriber rates are important considerations.”121  Comcast argues
that it is axiomatic that the ability of a cable operator to earn a fair rate of return under any
proposal for future operations depends on the effects of competition.122  Comcast asserts that it
currently competes with RCN-BecoCom, L.L.C., as well as providers of direct broadcast
satellite (“DBS”) services, and that Verizon Communications, Inc. (“Verizon”) has announced
that it is wiring part of Framingham so that it can offer video and other advanced services.123 
Comcast states that Framingham would not allow Comcast to question the Town Manager on
the  subject of competition, and that Framingham did not offer any evidence to indicate that it
ever analyzed the role of competition in consideration of Comcast’s proposal.124  Therefore,
Comcast argues “that error infects and invalidates the Town’s decision to deny.”125
(2) Framingham
Framingham contends that Comcast has cited to no legal source that supports its
argument.126  Framingham claims that applicable law does not require it to analyze the effect of
CTV 05-2 Page 36
127 Id.
128 Id. at 50–51.
129 Id. at 51.
130 H.R. Rep. 98-934, at 74.
competition.127  Framingham objects that “[t]here is no way that the Town could have
effectively estimated or evaluated the impact that these [competitive] services would have on
Comcast,” and that it “is not in the business of service as a cable operator.”128  Thus,
Framingham argues, it was required pursuant to Section 626 only “to ascertain the needs of the
Town and to weigh the costs of those needs as specifically shown by Comcast to be
unreasonable and against the benefit of the need.”129
b. Analysis
Comcast correctly notes that its ability to earn a fair rate of return is a factor in
determining whether the proposal is reasonable given the cost of meeting a community’s
cable-related needs and interests.130  The existence and extent of the effect of competition in
Framingham is relevant to Comcast’s ability to earn a fair rate of return.  Framingham’s
objection that it lacks the expertise to evaluate the effects of market competition is no grounds
for excluding relevant evidence.  Nevertheless, we are unable to rule as a matter of law that
excluding the evidence infected Framingham’s entire decision with error, because the existence
and extent of the effect of competition is a material question of fact that must be tried.  Because
we have determined that this proceeding is to be conducted de novo, Comcast will have the
CTV 05-2 Page 37
131 Comcast Mot. Taking Administrative Notice at 1-2.
132 Id. at 2; 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(11)(h); G.L. c. 30A, § 11(5).
opportunity, and has the burden of proof, to demonstrate in this proceeding the effect of
competition on its ability to earn a fair rate of return.
IV. MOTIONS TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
A. Positions of the Parties
Comcast asks the Cable Division to take administrative notice, pursuant to
801 C.M.R. § 1.01(10)(h), of exhibits and transcripts from the Framingham hearings,
deposition exhibits that were not entered into as evidence in the Framingham hearings, the
Framingham Decision itself, and a proposed order submitted to the Board of Selectmen by
Framingham’s special counsel prior to the issuance of the Framingham Decision.131  Comcast
argues that the Cable Division may take administrative notice if the parties are “notified of the
material so noticed” and given an opportunity to contest the noticed facts.132
Framingham opposes Comcast’s motion only with respect to:  Comcast’s
March 8, 2005 amendment to its renewal proposal, which Framingham argues was excluded
from evidence from the Framingham hearings and therefore should not be considered by the
Cable Division; the August 20, 2003, and the February 9, 2004, amendments to the
Framingham Cable Television License, which Framingham claims are not relevant; and the
letters and special magistrate’s report regarding the Cablevision/AT&T Broadband transfer
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from the year 2000, which Framingham also argues are not relevant.133  Framingham
additionally moves that the Cable Division take administrative notice of the Post-Hearing Brief
of the Town of Framingham (March 21, 2005) and Comcast’s proposed Order Granting
Renewal License (March 28, 2005).134
B. Analysis
The Cable Division’s authority to take administrative notice of facts is limited.  The
Cable Division may only take notice of (1) facts that may be judicially noticed by the courts, or
(2) general, technical or scientific facts within the Cable Division’s specialized knowledge.135 
While “administrative notice” is not the appropriate vehicle for entering the documents in
question into evidence, as Comcast suggests, there is no dispute between the parties as to the
authenticity of the documents.  Because both parties in their motions have argued that the same
documents should be entered into evidence, we treat these motions as a stipulation of
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documents to be entered into evidence.136  As for the materials to which Framingham objects,
since we cannot consider the parties to have stipulated to their use as evidence, we will rule on
their admissibility once they are offered as evidence.  In order to avoid unnecessary litigation,
the parties may stipulate in writing additional documents which shall be entered into evidence. 
Moreover, the parties may also stipulate facts at any time.137
V. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DECISION
A. Introduction
Both parties have filed motions for summary decision.  Comcast argues that the
majority of the issues presented are pure issues of law and there is no genuine dispute on the
facts material to the remaining issues, which may be resolved in its favor.  Framingham
maintains that summary decision is not appropriate, but in the alternative argues that it is
entitled to summary decision as a matter of law on 16 of the 22 reasons for the Framingham
Decision, specifically, reasons nos. 1–3, 7–9, 11–16, and 19–22.  As for the reasons nos. 4–6,
10, 17, and 18, Framingham argues that such decisions are so fact-intensive that summary
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decision in its favor is not appropriate.  Because we determine below that we are unable to
render judgment on the whole case upon Comcast’s motion, and because Framingham’s motion
is a motion for partial summary decision, we enter partial summary decision only.138  The
issues and arguments in both motions overlap extensively.  We consider both motions together
below.
B. Summary Decision Standard of Review
The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, which govern the conduct
of formal proceedings of agencies subject to Chapter 30A, authorize the use of full or partial
summary decision in agency decisions.139  The rule specifically provides that “[w]hen a Party is
of the opinion there is no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and
he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the Party may move, with or without supporting
affidavits, for summary decision on the claim or defense.”140  Summary decision may be
granted by an administrative agency where the pleadings and filings conclusively show that the
absence of a hearing could not affect the decision.141  The Cable Division reviews motions for
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summary decision according to the same standard applied by the courts in reviewing motions
for summary judgment.142
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.143  The moving party
bears the burden of demonstrating affirmatively the absence of a triable issue and that the
summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.144  The
moving party may satisfy this burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of the opposing party’s case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has
no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case at trial.145  “A complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other
facts immaterial.”146  Mere contradictions of factual allegations, without evidentiary support,
are insufficient to raise questions of material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion.147
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There is no merit to Framingham’s alternative argument that the Cable Division may
not entertain motions for summary decision in this proceeding.148  The argument is based on
Framingham’s assertion that the use of the word “hearing,” in G.L. c. 166A, §§ 14 and 19, as
opposed to “administrative proceedings,” limits the Cable Division’s action to permitting the
parties to state their cases and then approving or disapproving the Framingham Decision, and
does not subject this proceeding to Chapter 30A, other than in the conduct of the hearing
itself.149  There is, however, no such distinction in Chapter 30A.150  Framingham further
argues that insofar as summary decision does not require the Cable Division to review the
entire record of the Framingham proceedings, granting summary decision would amount to
procedural error, because, according to Framingham, G.L. c. 166A, § 14 requires the
Cable Division to review the entire record before Framingham.151   The regulation providing
for summary decision is well-established.152  A hearing is not required for matters that are not
in genuine dispute or where the pleadings and papers filed conclusively show that a hearing on
such matters will not affect the decision.
CTV 05-2 Page 43
153 Framingham Mem. Summ. Decision at 16.
154 Id. at 60.
155 Comcast Mot. Summ. Decision at 60.
156 Id. at 62.
157 Id. at 61.
C. Specific Reasons for Denial of the Renewal Proposal
1. Customer Service Office (Reason 1)
a. Positions of the Parties
Framingham denied the renewal proposal, because Comcast refused to agree “to
continue staffing and operating a customer service office in Framingham, as currently required
by the 1999 Renewal License during a subsequent renewal term.”153  Comcast argues as a
preliminary matter that Framingham’s denial on this ground is based on a mistake of fact,
because Comcast did not propose to close the existing customer service office, but rather it
stated that it would keep a local customer service office either in Framingham or in a
contiguous community.154  Comcast states that it offered to “comply with all customer service
regulations of the FCC (47 C.F.R. § 76) as they exist or as they may be amended from time to
time,” as well as the regulations of the Cable Division.155  Comcast maintains that its proposal
meets the FCC’s requirement that customer service offices be “conveniently located.”156 
Comcast claims that Framingham never offered evidence that the community had an interest in,
or need for, a customer service office located “within Town limits.”157
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Framingham argues that it has the right to require continuation of the Framingham
customer service office.  Framingham maintains that the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 552(d)(2),
specifically singles out customer service as an area where municipalities may adopt regulations
that exceed the FCC’s standards.158  In addition, Framingham notes that G.L. c. 166A, § 5(o)
specifically provides that such conditions may be imposed with respect to customer service
offices.159  Framingham asserts that it is undisputed that Comcast’s renewal proposal did not
provide for the continuation of such an office, and that at no time did Comcast demonstrate
that the costs of continuing to operate the office were either unreasonable, unfair, or adverse to
the interests of its subscribers.160  Framingham states that prior cable licenses have always
required a customer service office to be located in Framingham.161  Framingham notes that
Comcast’s survey indicated that customers were satisfied with Comcast’s predecessor’s,
AT&T Broadband’s, local payment center customer service and that approximately 4,200
subscribers had visited the office.
b. Analysis
Although the federal standard requires only that customer service offices be
“conveniently located,” state law requires Comcast to agree to “[t]he maintenance of local
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offices or local telephone connections in the communities served.”162  The Cable Act does not
preclude the establishment or enforcement of state law concerning customer service
requirements that exceed the federal standard.163  Nevertheless, G.L. c. 166A, § 5(o) is not a
grant of power to the issuing authority to require a local office; the cable operator has the
option simply to maintain a local telephone connection in the communities served.  Maintaining
a telephone connection to a customer service office in a contiguous town would satisfy the local
telephone connection requirement should Comcast choose to relocate the current Framingham
customer service office.
If the issuing authority requires the cable operator to maintain a local customer service
office in an RFP, that requirement is subject to Section 626(c)(1)(D) of the Cable Act. 
Framingham ascertained the need for a local customer service office.  Comcast therefore had
the burden to demonstrate that the omission of a proposal to maintain a Framingham office was
reasonable, given the level of interest of Framingham subscribers and the cost of meeting that
need.  Comcast makes no showing in its motion for summary decision that the cost of
continuing to operate the Framingham office would be unreasonable.  Therefore Comcast’s
motion is denied on this issue.  Framingham, however, has the burden to demonstrate in its
motion for summary decision that Comcast would be unable to demonstrate in this de novo
proceeding that its proposal is reasonable given the cost.  Although Framingham points to
evidence that Framingham subscribers are satisfied with the local office, this does not negate a
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showing in this proceeding that they would be unwilling to pay for the cost of the office; nor
does Framingham demonstrate that Comcast cannot demonstrate the cost of the office in this
proceeding.  Because Framingham did not meet its initial burden on summary decision,
Framingham’s motion is denied on this point.
2. Public, Educational, or Government Access (Reasons 2–7, 17)
a. Introduction
The RFP contained a number of requests regarding local programming, studio facilities,
and funding requirements.  Under the current franchise, Comcast operates a public access
studio and produces local origination (“LO”) programming in Framingham, and maintains
channel capacity for public access, educational, and governmental (“PEG”) programming.164
Framingham’s RFP required Comcast to “continue to produce a minimum of
sixteen (16) hours of unduplicated Framingham-based LO/Public Access programming each
week of interest to Framingham subscribers.”165  The RFP further specified that “[t]he Public
Access programming produced shall cover the arts, senior citizens, sports, children, health,
Town events as well as other community topics and matters.”166  The RFP required Comcast to
“cablecast its LO programming on a channel that will be separate from the three (3) PEG
Access channels . . . .”167
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The RFP required Comcast to continue operating and staffing the “LO/Public Access
studio,”168 operate a mobile production van,169 and provide public access training courses to be
taught by the studio staff.170  The RFP required Comcast to provide equipment for the studio,
as well as an equipment replacement schedule.171
To support public access studio equipment requirements, the RFP requested a capital
expenditure of at least $225,000.  The RFP also required Comcast to “provide annual funding
for PEG Access and LO programming use only,” the amount of which would be determined
after negotiation between the parties.172  To support educational access programming, the RFP
required Comcast to pay 1 percent of its gross annual revenues to the Framingham School
District, provide $100,000 in equipment funding, and matching grants of two dollars for every
one dollar expenditure by the school district for capital upgrades to the educational access
studio up to $100,000.173  To support governmental access programming, the RFP further
required Comcast to pay 1 percent of its gross annual revenues to the issuing authority and
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provide $100,000 in equipment funding.174  Finally, the RFP prohibited Comcast from
charging subscribers for any existing costs related to PEG access costs.175
Comcast’s response to the RFP proposed to provide “capital and operating financial
support so as to allow PEG access programming to continue under the auspices of a non-profit
PEG Access corporation” and proposed to transfer the existing studio production van and
equipment to an access corporation.176  Comcast also proposed that the access corporation
would be responsible for conducting training classes.177  With respect to LO programming, the
proposal left LO programming and the allocation of any LO channels to Comcast’s sole
discretion.178  Comcast’s proposal reserved the right to pass through the operational costs of the
PEG access studio “in accordance with applicable law.”179  Comcast’s funding offer included a
total capital grant of $130,000 for the purchase of PEG equipment or facilities, plus
2.5 percent of gross cable services revenues for public access programming, 1 percent for
educational programming, and 1 percent for government programming.180
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Framingham’s stated reasons for denial with respect to these matters were that Comcast
“refused to continue staffing, managing, operating and maintaining the existing Comcast Public
Access studio in Framingham;” that Comcast “insisted upon passing-through to subscribers all
Public Access-related costs as if all of such costs were entirely new costs;” that Comcast
proposed that Framingham or a designee assume responsibility for providing Public Access
programming to subscribers and that Framingham believes that this would “increase costs to
Framingham subscribers;” that Comcast would not agree to continue to operate and make
available a mobile production van; that Comcast would not agree to provide public access
training classes; and that Comcast would not agree to produce and cablecast local origination
and public access programming.181  With regard to funding, Framingham stated as grounds for
denial of the renewal proposal that Comcast refused to provide $100,000 for educational access
equipment, matching grants for capital upgrades to the educational access studio, and $100,000
for governmental access equipment.182
b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast argues that Framingham has no legal authority to require Comcast to produce
public access and LO programming or to operate a public access studio.  Comcast argues that
because a cable operator is “under no federal mandate to provide public access programming,”
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it follows that Framingham may not require Comcast to provide such programming.183 
Comcast asserts that federal law preempts local requirements that are “inconsistent with
Comcast’s rights under the Cable Act.”184  Therefore, Comcast argues, Reasons 2, 3, 7,
and 17 for the Framingham Decision must be rejected as a matter of law because they are
inconsistent with the Cable Act.185
Comcast acknowledges that the Cable Act allows a franchising authority to require a
cable operator to set aside channel capacity for PEG Access.186  Comcast also does not contest
Framingham’s authority to request equipment and capital for public access.187  Rather, Comcast
contends that Framingham does not have authority to require Comcast to operate a public
access studio and produce programming, because Section 611(b) does not enumerate such
powers and provides only that franchising authorities may demand no more than the
designation of channel capacity for PEG use.188  Comcast argues that nothing prevents a cable
operator from exceeding in its renewal proposal the issuing authorities’ renewal requirements,
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and that franchising authorities have the power to enforce such franchise requirements only
when the cable operator “offered and agreed” to operate a public access studio and produce
programming.189  Comcast argues that Section 611(c) does nothing more than provide a
statutory basis for a local government to enforce PEG access commitments voluntarily made in
excess of the requirements that may be established by an RFP.190
In addition, Comcast argues that Framingham impermissibly based its denial on the
grounds that Comcast would pass-through its public access-related costs.191  Comcast argues
that this is a form of rate regulation that the Town is prohibited from considering.192  Comcast
argues that state or local requirements governing the rates for cable service are permissible
only to the extent that they are consistent with the FCC’s rate rules and that cable operators
and local franchising authorities may not even voluntarily enter into franchises that regulate
rates in a manner that contravenes the Cable Act.193
Comcast argues that its proposal to transfer responsibility for public access
programming to a public access corporation meets community needs as a matter of law.194 
Comcast contends that it has produced evidence that a public access corporation is better suited
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were attached to Comcast’s motion.  Therefore, we do not consider this assertion in our
Order.
200 Comcast Reply to Framingham Opp. to Comcast Mot. Summ. Decision at 16, citing
JX. 27, at 19; JX.33, at 12.
to meet the community’s needs with respect to local programming than Comcast.195  Comcast
argues that Framingham did not rebut its showing with expert testimony or other evidence, and
that the Town’s witnesses have no knowledge of the operations of access corporations.196
Comcast claims that Framingham presented no evidence to show that its proposed
funding would be inadequate.197  Comcast further claims that Framingham presented no
evidence that the money that the Town requested in its RFP was necessary to meet any
community cable-related need or interest.198  Comcast states that it has given Framingham
$233,000 over the past five years to support PEG access, PEG access services, and equipment,
and that it already purchased new equipment for the studio less than three years ago.199 
Comcast claims that the proposed funding will increase funding, or, at a minimum, will be
cost-neutral.200  Comcast states that its poll indicates that 75 percent of customers either
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moderately or strongly oppose an increase in their bill to provide support for PEG access
equipment and facilities.201  Thus, Comcast argues that the proposed funding was reasonable.
(2) Framingham
Framingham acknowledges that the Cable Act does not “require” the cable operator to
provide public access programming.202  Conversely, according to Framingham, there is nothing
in the Cable Act that prohibits an issuing authority from seeking to have its cable operator
continue to operate a public access studio.203  Framingham states that local governments may
require channels for PEG access use, pursuant to Section 611(a).204  Framingham then states
that Section 611(b) designates the local franchising authority, not the cable operator, as the
party with the key role in determining the particulars of how such PEG access uses will be
implemented.205  Framingham argues that this “broad delegation” of authority to make rules
about the governance of PEG access channels must also include the power to determine
whether company staff or non-company staff should maintain and oversee the use of the
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channels.206  Framingham states that through public hearings, it “ascertained” community
needs and interests in Comcast’s continued management, operation, and staffing of the
Framingham public access studio.207
Framingham counters Comcast’s claim that a cable operator is “under no federal
mandate to provide public access programming,” noting that Comcast omits the initial part of
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Glendora v. Malone, which stated that “because they are
created by franchise agreements between municipalities and cable operators, ‘public access’
channels such as Channel 8 are not creatures of federal law.”208  Framingham argues that
Section 611(c) grants it the authority to enforce “any provisions of the franchise for services,
facilities, or equipment,” and therefore the Cable Act envisioned that the licensing agreement
could require the services at issue.209  Framingham argues that Comcast’s position is not
supported by law, because franchise licenses typically include provisions for cable operators to
provide PEG access equipment, financial support, personnel to operate the PEG access
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production facilities, promotion of the programs by means of a cable guide, or video
production course training.210
Framingham does not move for summary judgment on the issue of the reasonableness
of funding levels, because, according to Framingham, the issues are so fact-intensive as to be
unreviewable on summary judgment.211  Framingham asserts that Comcast’s survey was
developed to produce responses that would support Comcast’s position.212  Framingham
contends that Comcast merely asserts without basis that Framingham does not need the funding
level requested.  Thus, Framingham argues that Comcast has not established that the cost of
meeting the terms of the RFP outweighs the local need.213
c. Analysis
(1) Services, Facilities, and Equipment
With respect to the operation of local access studio, access studio staff training, and the
mobile production van and other public access studio equipment, the question before the
Cable Division is whether an issuing authority can mandate such requirements in its RFP. 
Section 624(a) provides a general proscription against franchise regulation of “services,
facilities, and equipment provided by a cable operator except to the extent consistent with [the
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Cable Act].”214  Section 611(a) provides that a franchise authority may establish PEG access
requirements in a franchise “only to the extent provided [in Section 611].”215  Thus, contrary
to Framingham’s position, the authority to impose franchise requirements regarding PEG
access must arise from the issuing authority’s enumerated powers and not merely from the
absence of a provision prohibiting an issuing authority from requiring its cable operator to
consent to such requirements.
We determine that no provision of the Cable Act grants Framingham the authority to
impose requirements for the operation of a local access studio, access studio staff training, or a
mobile production van or other public access studio facilities or equipment in an RFP.216 
Section 611(b) provides only that a franchise authority may require that “channel capacity” be
designated for PEG use and require “rules and procedures for the use of the channel capacity
designated.”217
The provision permitting a franchising authority to “require rules and procedures for
the use of the channel capacity designated” does not expand Framingham’s authority to impose
services, facilities, or equipment requirements.  Congress’ explanation of this term suggests
that the term “rules and procedures for the use of channel capacity” was intended to refer to
rules that allocate the use of the channel capacity and establish programming requirements,
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rather than rules that would establish services, facilities, or equipment requirements.218 
Further, the term similarly appears in subsection (d), which provides that the local franchising
authority may prescribe “rules and procedures under which the cable operator is permitted to
use such channel capacity for the provision of other services if such channel capacity is not
being used for the purposes designated” and “rules and procedures under which such permitted
use shall cease.”219  Such rules and procedures under subsection (d) similarly were intended to
have an allocative role.220  Thus, we conclude that Section 611(b) does not grant a local
franchising authority the power to impose a requirement for services, facilities, or equipment
beyond cable system-related requirements necessary to provide the designated channel
capacity.
We also are not convinced that Framingham may derive authority to impose such
requirements from Section 611(c).  Under Section 611(c), a local franchising authority “may
enforce any requirement in any franchise . . . [including] any provisions of the franchise for
services, facilities, or equipment . . . .”221  Significantly, this section provides only
enforcement authority and not the authority to require such provisions, as Framingham claims. 
The remainder of the passage, which Framingham does not highlight, clarifies that this
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enforcement authority applies to provisions that are “proposed by the cable operator which
relate to public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity, whether or not required
by the franchising authority pursuant to subsection (b).”222  Section 611(c) therefore permits
the local franchising authority to enforce requirements included in the franchise that a cable
operator offers “in excess of minimum requirements that might be established in an RFP.”223 
Subsections (b) and (c) are not coextensive.
 The only provision that grants authority to a franchising authority to impose
requirements for facilities or equipment is Section 624(b), which grants such authority only “to
the extent related to the establishment or operation of a cable system.”224  The Cable Act
defines the term “cable system” as “a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths
and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide
cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers
within a community . . . .”225  A “cable service” in turn is defined as “one-way transmission to
subscribers” or “subscriber interaction” that may be required to select video programming.226 
Thus, the Cable Act grants to the local franchising authority the power to impose cable-related
facilities and equipment requirements that pertain to facilities and equipment for the
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transmission of video programming.  There is no genuine dispute between the parties about the
nature and purpose of the facilities and equipment that Framingham demanded.  Framingham’s
purpose in requiring Comcast to provide a staffed and equipped public access production studio
and a mobile production van was to address what Framingham claims is the public’s need for
facilities to produce public access programming.  Save for the transmission paths and
equipment necessary to transport a signal from the studio to subscribers, we find that the public
access production studio and equipment, training courses, and mobile production van cannot be
characterized as related to the operation of a “cable system.”227
We note that Section 624(b)(2) has a similar construction to Section 611(c).  Thus, we
read Section 624(b)(2) as providing statutory authority to enforce terms for facilities and
equipment whether or not related to the establishment or operation of a cable system, if
voluntarily offered by the cable operator and reduced to the franchise agreement.  That is,
Comcast may voluntarily offer terms to operate a PEG access studio, but it has no obligation to
do so.  Comcast may voluntarily offer to provide PEG studio equipment and facilities to the
issuing authority or to an access corporation, but it has no obligation to do so.
Thus, as a matter of law, Framingham has no authority to require Comcast to operate
or staff a public access studio, to provide public access studio training, or to provide a mobile
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Framingham’s reliance upon Chicago Cable Communications, 678 F. Supp. 734 and
Glendora v. Cablevision, 893 F.Supp. 264, is similarly misplaced.  Demarest provides
no counsel, because the entity providing public access studio services in that case was
an independent public access corporation, precisely what Comcast proposes to establish
in Framingham.  Finally, neither Erie Telecommunications nor Danville provide any
support to Framingham’s argument that it may require continued cable operator staffing
of the public access studio in a renewal proposal.
production van or other public access studio equipment.228  The Cable Division determines that
Comcast’s refusal to continue operating the local access studio, provide studio training, or
provide studio equipment cannot be a factor in denying its renewal proposal as a matter of law.
We turn to the question of Comcast’s obligations with respect to LO.  LO is
programming which is developed by the cable operator specifically for the community it
serves.  LO programming is not PEG programming.  Indeed, Framingham’s RFP treats LO
differently, requiring Comcast to air such programming on a separate channel.  Therefore,
Section 611 is inapplicable to our analysis.
Section 624, however, addresses a franchising authority’s role with respect to
programming services provided by a cable operator.  Section 624(b)(1) provides that in a
request for a franchise renewal proposal, the local franchising authority may not “establish
requirements for video programming or other information services,” other than certain notice
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requirements under Section 624(h), which are not relevant.229  Where the Cable Act grants the
franchising authority the power to enforce programming requirements, the grant is narrowly
defined to include only “broad categories of video programming.”  Framingham argues that
LO should be considered such a broad category of programming.  We disagree, and, more
importantly, we find that Framingham’s claimed authority under Section 624(b)(2) to “enforce
any requirements contained within the franchise . . . for broad categories of video
programming or other services” cannot be read to grant Framingham the authority in its RFP
to impose LO requirements upon Comcast, because that would be contrary to the plain
meaning of Section 624(b)(1).  The local franchising authority’s power to “enforce” the
provision of broad categories of programming is only relevant if the cable operator has made a
voluntary commitment to provide such programming as a bargained-for term during the course
of its negotiations with the local franchising authority.  Thus, the Cable Division determines
that Framingham does not have the authority to establish an LO programming requirement in
the RFP.  The Cable Division determines that Comcast’s refusal to commit to providing LO
programming cannot be a factor in denying its renewal proposal as a matter of law.
(2) Pass-Through
With respect to the pass-through of operational costs related to public access, we agree
with Comcast that whether, and to what extent, Comcast may pass through such costs in rates
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is a ratemaking issue subject to the Cable Division’s jurisdiction.230  Framingham may not
prohibit Comcast from passing approved costs through to subscribers.  The Cable Division
determines that Comcast’s assertion of its right to pass through such costs in accordance with
applicable law may not be a factor in Framingham’s denying the renewal proposal.
(3) PEG Funding and Public Access Corporation
Although we have determined that Framingham was precluded, as a matter of law,
from mandating terms relative to the operation of the public access studio, there nonetheless
remains a question of fact as to the reasonableness of Comcast’s PEG access funding proposals
for operational costs and capital.  Thus, we must determine whether Framingham’s funding
needs can be shown in this proceeding to be in the interests of the community in view of the
costs.231
Framingham did not move for summary decision on this issue as it claimed that it was
so fact-intensive as to preclude summary decision.  As for the level of funding that Comcast
has offered to provide for the operation of the PEG access studio, Comcast cites to evidence
that demonstrates that its proposal is cost-neutral.232  Framingham admits that its Town
Manager and Assistant Manager had no experience with access corporations, nor did they have
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any way to determine what the cost of operating the studio would be.233  Thus, Framingham is
unable to dispute in this proceeding that the estimated yearly expense to operate a public access
studio, based on 2002 costs, would be $137,000, and the proposed 2.5 percent of gross annual
cable service revenues would yield $224,000 during the first year to approximately $320,000
in a tenth year, if the franchise were granted for that period.234  Comcast, however, did not
demonstrate in its motion for summary decision the operational cost to provide educational or
governmental programming.  Thus, there remains a material question of fact whether
Comcast’s offer to provide 1 percent of its annual cable service revenues to support educational
programming, and 1 percent to support government programming, is sufficient.  Moreover,
the only substantive discussion in the motions of the capital improvement costs necessary to
continue the same level of operation of the studio is Comcast’s assertion that the equipment
“should be relatively new and will not need replacing for some time,” based on the fact that
Framingham has received, and currently receives, capital support from Comcast.235  We find
that this statement is insufficient to establish a lack of a genuine material dispute as to the
necessary capital support.  The actual expected capital costs have not been established. 
Whether Comcast’s total offer to support operations and capital upgrades is reasonable remains
a question of fact to be tried.  Accordingly, we deny Comcast’s motion for summary decision
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in part on the issue of the reasonableness of its proposal for PEG access corporation and
funding.
3. Emergency Alert Services (Reason 8)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to “continue to provide the current required Emergency
Alert Override Capability for the Town, to be controlled by the Issuing authority. (See
Renewal License, Section 3.22).  At a minimum, such a system should include over-ride [sic.]
capacity authorized by a remote-control telephone code.”236  Comcast proposed to comply with
all federal regulations relative to Emergency Alert Systems at 47 C.F.R. Part 11.237 
Framingham rejected the renewal proposal on this issue, because “Comcast would not agree to
continue to make available to the Issuing Authority or its designee(s) the capability for
emergency override messages over the Cable System.”238
b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast maintains that it has not proposed to make any changes from the emergency
alert system (“EAS”) currently in place under the existing license.239  According to Comcast,
the existing license provides that the Framingham system
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shall have an activated Emergency Alert System . . . that will override the audio
and video Signal(s) carried on the Framingham Subscriber Network.  The EAS
will switch-off Cable Television Signals at the local Hub site and automatically
insert video and audio messages that will alert and instruct Subscribers to follow
specific emergency related instructions.  The Licensee shall meet all FCC EAS
requirements.240
Thus, Comcast argues, the existing license does not require Comcast to provide emergency
alert override capability to Framingham.241
Moreover, Comcast contends that local EAS override is inconsistent with FCC EAS
requirements and the Massachusetts State EAS Plan.242  Comcast claims that only four agencies
may activate the EAS under the Massachusetts plan: the Governor, the state police, the
National Weather Service, and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
(“MEMA”).  Further, Comcast asserts, MEMA is responsible for disseminating emergency
information to the public, and under the current plan, local authorities must contact MEMA to
request activation of the system.243  Comcast contends that any separate local insertion
capability must be specifically approved by state officials.244  Comcast contends that it has
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offered uncontradicted evidence that local override capability would be less effective than the
EAS mandated by federal law and could interfere with federal and state plans.245
Comcast argues that Framingham offered no evidence of a need for local insertion
capability.246  Finally, Comcast argues that in light of the cost, which Comcast claims is
excessive, required to install the technology that would permit Framingham to override the
entire system, and in the absence of data supporting Framingham’s need for override
capability, “it is apparent from the evidence that when costs are taken into account, Comcast’s
proposal is adequate to meet Framingham’s EAS needs and interests.”247
(2) Framingham
Framingham cites to the same provision in Section 3.22 of the 1999 Renewal License,
claiming that the license required emergency communications capabilities that enable local
safety officials to override television programming in the event of a local emergency.248 
Framingham states that the FCC’s rules on EAS are “merely permissive—and not
mandatory—regarding local emergency participation.”249  Framingham argues that simply
because the Massachusetts EAS Plan identifies four state agencies that are authorized to
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activate the EAS at the state level does not necessarily mean that local communities are
forbidden from doing so.250  Therefore, Framingham contends, the provision of local overrides
is left to local negotiations.251  In its motion for summary decision, Framingham asserts that it
is a “commonly known fact” that local safety officials are the “first responders” in most
emergencies, and that “municipal officials felt that after September 11, 2001, local override
technology was more important than ever.”252  Moreover, Framingham asserts that most
emergencies occur at the local level and that 47 percent of all emergency broadcast system
alerts were generated locally.253
c. Analysis
Framingham mischaracterizes the nature of Comcast’s obligations with respect to local
emergency alert participation in claiming that it may require Comcast to provide it with a local
override capability as a matter of law.  Under the FCC’s current regulations, EAS participants
are required to transmit national emergency messages, and may, but are not required to,
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participate in State and Local EAS plans.254  This does not open the provision of local override
capability to the discretion of local franchising authorities, because participation in state and
local plans is at the discretion of the cable system.255
Moreover, cable systems that do choose to participate in State and Local EAS plans
must conduct EAS operations “as specified in State or Local Area EAS Plans.”256  State or
Local Area plans must be reviewed and approved by the Department of Homeland Security
prior to implementation to ensure that they are consistent with national plans, FCC regulations,
and EAS operation.257  Unless such a plan exists, Framingham may not require Comcast to
provide it with the capability to override the cable system as a matter of law.  Framingham’s
claim of need for such a capability as a “first responder” does not overcome the prerequisite of
a specific and coordinated plan.  Framingham has not alleged the existence of an approved plan
specifically granting Framingham the authority to activate EAS.258  Thus, as a matter of law,
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Framingham may not require a cable operator to provide it with the capability to activate EAS. 
Therefore, we grant Comcast’s motion and deny Framingham’s motion on the EAS issue.
4. Institutional Network (Reason 9)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast “to operate and maintain the current Institutional Network
(“I-Net”), in order to continue providing the Town with bandwidth for municipal, educational
and institutional use . . . .”259  Comcast offered
to provide the Town with a Fifty Thousand Dollar ($50,000) Technology Grant
to be used towards procuring other forms of technology to satisfy the Town’s
data needs, rather than continue to maintain the existing I-Net through the term
of the renewal license.  In addition, the Licensee will provide the Town with an
annual grant of one-quarter percent (0.25%) of its gross annual revenues to be
used to fund such other technologies.260
Although the parties have briefed the Cable Division on a number of additional obligations
requested in the RFP pertaining to the I-Net, namely, providing drops to additional locations,
the installation of fiber optics, and annual funding, Framingham states that its only grounds for
its denial of Comcast’s proposal with respect to the I-Net was related to Comcast’s failure to
continue to maintain the existing data capability on the I-Net.261  Therefore, because
Framingham does not object to the other aspects of Comcast’s proposal with respect to the
I-Net, we review the parties’ arguments only regarding existing data capability below.
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b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast states that the Cable Act authorizes the Town to request capacity on an I-Net
that the company constructs or operates to serve only non-residential subscribers, but does not
require Comcast to build an I-Net.262  Comcast contends that it did not propose to discontinue
the operation of, or disable the functionality of, data transmission services on the existing
I-Net.263  Rather, Comcast states that it proposed only to disclaim responsibility for maintaining
the current I-Net for data transmissions, based on its experience that technical problems with
data transmission typically arise from equipment failure at the user end, and because the parts
required to support the current I-Net data functionality are no longer being manufactured.264 
Comcast suggests that Framingham does not need Comcast to provide an I-Net since RCN
operates a newly constructed I-Net in the town, and that a coaxial I-Net is not a technically
practical or financially feasible back-up system.265  Comcast contends that its proposal meets
Framingham’s I-Net related needs and interests, when the cost of meeting those needs and
interests are taken into account.266  
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Framingham states that the current and prior cable licenses have required an I-Net with
data capabilities and that the Town relies on it.267  Framingham argues that it has the right to
require continuation of the use of the I-Net for data transmission.268  Framingham claims that it
found strong support for Comcast’s continuing to maintain the I-Net’s existing data
capabilities.269  Framingham claims that Comcast refused to continue to allow it to use the
I-Net for data transmission purposes and did not respond in any manner to the Town’s request
that the I-Net continue to be capable of providing data transmissions.270
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c. Analysis
The issue is not whether Framingham may require Comcast to build an I-Net or provide
certain data transmission capability, but rather concerns the maintenance of the existing I-Net. 
Comcast’s argument with respect to the cost focuses on a false point by demonstrating the cost
of building a new, fiber-based I-Net.  Although there may be evidence that Framingham’s data
needs exceed the capacity of Comcast’s I-Net, Framingham’s RFP only required Comcast to
maintain the current data capability.  Therefore, Comcast has no obligation to build a higher
capacity fiber-based I-Net.  Further, Comcast did not propose discontinuing Framingham’s use
of the I-Net for data transmission purposes as Framingham claims.  Rather, Comcast proposed
that it would stop maintaining the data transmission capability of the I-Net, and instead offered
a capital grant to Framingham to be used to procure an alternative data technology.  Therefore,
we must determine whether Comcast’s proposal to provide a capital grant is reasonable to meet
Framingham’s ascertained need, i.e. continued maintenance of the current data capability of
the I-Net, balanced against the cost of having Comcast maintain that capability. 
Comcast did not demonstrate the cost of maintaining the current capability, so we
cannot determine that the cost is unreasonable; nor did Comcast demonstrate that the proposed
capital grant was sufficient to meet Framingham’s need to maintain the current data capability
by procuring an alternate technology.  Framingham also did not meet its burden on summary
decision to demonstrate that Comcast would be unable to make such a demonstration of cost if
this case were tried.  Therefore, both motions are denied on the I-Net issue.
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5. Cable System Extensions and Line Extension Charges (Reason 10)
a. Introduction
The RFP included a build-out requirement to all residents “without additional
installation charges.”271  Comcast proposed a build-out obligation with a dwelling density limit: 
“[t]he Licensee shall not be obligated to extend the Cable Communications System into any
area where there are fewer than thirty (30) dwelling units per areal strand mile and sixty (60)
dwelling units per underground mile of cable, calculated from the nearest trunk line.”272  With
respect to installation costs, Comcast proposed that installations within 125 feet of the existing
cable system plant would be entitled to “standard” installation rates, and installations over
125 feet from existing plant would be provided at actual cost plus a reasonable rate of return.273 
Framingham denied the proposal in this regard on the grounds that “Comcast would not agree
to continue to make its cable service available to all Framingham residents without additional
so-called line-extension charges (other than customary installation costs), as currently required
by the Renewal License.”274
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b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast argues, as an initial matter, that Framingham does not have legal authority to
require Comcast to accept a license requirement to build additional cable system facilities while
foregoing its legal right to recover the costs of such construction through customer
payments.275  Comcast argues that it is permitted by law to recover the costs of extending its
cable system plant and to impose standard charges for connections within 125 feet of the
existing plant.276  Comcast notes that the 1999 Renewal License allowed Comcast to recover
actual costs to extend the cable system to within 150 feet for aerial installations and 100 feet
for underground installation.277  With respect to the density terms, Comcast notes that the 1987
license only required the cable system to be built in areas with an average density of
70 residential units per mile or 35 subscribing customers per mile.278  Comcast states that its
proposal would exclude homes only in new subdivisions built in the less dense, northern part
of Framingham, where the developer did not put conduit in the ground for cable services.279 
Comcast argues that the cost of installation in such areas would be prohibitive.280
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(2) Framingham
Framingham does not move for summary decision on this point, because it argues that
the question is so fact intensive as to be unreviewable on summary decision.281  Framingham
argues that Comcast failed to establish that it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.  In
response to Comcast’s motion, Framingham argues that 47 C.F.R. § 76.309(c)(2)(i) does not
support Comcast’s argument that it has a legal right to recover the cost of construction through
customer payments, because that section deals with customer service obligations.282
c. Analysis
Although Framingham is correct that 47 C.F.R. § 76.309(c)(2)(i) is a customer service
standard, Comcast’s right to pass through the cost of installations to extend the cable system to
within 125 feet of a dwelling arises from 47 C.F.R. § 76.925.  That is, a requirement to
include in the definition of standard installation those installations that are at a distance beyond
125 feet from the existing distribution system would be a franchise requirement that exceeds
federal customer service standards at 47 C.F.R. § 76.309, and thus, the costs of compliance of
which would be treated as a franchise related cost and recoverable.283  Framingham has no
authority to require any particular rate treatment be accorded to these costs.284  Accordingly,
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Framingham’s stated reason for denying Comcast’s proposal on this issue is unreasonable as a
matter of law.
Nevertheless, we are unable on the record before us to determine whether Comcast’s
proposal was reasonable given that Framingham excluded all evidence of competition from the
proceeding below.  The reasonableness of a build-out requirement is dependent upon an
analysis of the company’s ability to earn a return on its investment.  The presence, if any, and
the extent of competition would be relevant factors in that analysis.  Moreover, Comcast did
not demonstrate the cost is unreasonable or that Framingham’s subscribers are unwilling to pay
for the cost of extending service to such areas of Framingham.  These remain questions of fact
to be tried.
6. Senior Discounts (Reason 11)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to provide a discount to senior citizens over the age
of 62.285  Comcast responded by offering to continue to provide a senior discount outside of the
licensing process.286  In support, Comcast argued that while it is not prohibited from providing
such a discount, the Town cannot mandate one.287 
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b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast argues that requiring a senior discount constitutes rate regulation.288  Comcast
notes that the Cable Division has stated that “no state law or regulation requires an operator to
offer such a discount and thus, the issue is left to license negotiations.”289  Comcast states that
state and local requirements governing rates are permissible only to the extent that they are
consistent with the FCC’s rate rules.290
Comcast urges the Cable Division to reject Framingham’s argument that
Section 623(e)(1) grants it the power to require a senior discount.291  Comcast argues that this
section provides only that senior discounts are discretionary for a cable operator.  Comcast
states that Section 623(d) establishes a general requirement for cable operators to maintain a
“uniform rate structure.”292  Comcast then argues that Section 623(e) grants the Cable Division
the power to prohibit rate discrimination, but that Section 623(e)(1) provides that no
government “may prohibit a cable operator from offering reasonable discounts to senior
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citizens or other economically disadvantaged group discounts.”293  Comcast argues that while
this section limits a franchising authority’s ability to preclude voluntary senior discounts, it
nowhere implies a right to compel such discounts.  Comcast maintains that this section should
be read in contrast with Section 623(e)(2), which permits franchising authorities to “requir[e]
and regulat[e] the installation or rental of equipment which facilitates the reception of cable
service by hearing impaired individuals.”294  Comcast argues that had Congress intended to
leave local regulators with the authority to “require and regulate” senior discounts, it would
have drafted subsection (e)(1) consistently with subsection (e)(2).295
(2) Framingham
Framingham asserts that negotiating a senior discount is allowable under federal law
and does not constitute rate regulation.296  Framingham claims that its legal right to require
such a discount arises from Section 623(e)(1).297  Framingham argues that the FCC has
repeatedly found that “the specific senior rate provisions in the agreement are solely within the
purview of local law.”298  According to Framingham, the FCC held, in Matter of Harron
Communications Corp., that “[a]lthough the senior citizen discounts are required in Harron’s
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Rockland system franchises and may not have been offered . . . without a franchise
requirement, the mere presence of a franchise requirement does not automatically result in a
cable operator’s right to recover its value as an external cost.”299  Framingham states that the
Cable Division has recognized that such discounts are allowed under federal law.300
Framingham claims that a senior discount is a local need that Comcast refused to
address or provide explanation for its discontinuance.301  Framingham contends that the fact
that senior discounts were included in prior licenses for over 20 years demonstrates that the
cost of such discounts is reasonable.302  Framingham maintains that although Comcast has
stated that it intends to continue the senior discount, it should not be permitted to excise the
term from the franchise without a showing of hardship.303  Framingham contends that it is not
required to renew a cable license agreement based on an unenforceable letter of intent.304
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c. Analysis
Each party relies on its interpretation of Section 623 to support its position with respect
to discounts provided to senior citizens.  Section 623(d) contains the general requirement that
cable operators maintain an “uniform rate structure.”  Section 623 allows an exception to the
general rule by deeming reasonable discounts to senior citizens nondiscriminatory.  The
subsection creates no obligations, and preserves existing state jurisdiction,305 except that the
Cable Division may not prohibit a cable operator from offering reasonable discounts to senior
citizens or other disadvantaged groups.
We contrast Section 623 (e)(1) with Section 623(e)(2), which permits franchising
authorities to “requir[e] and regulat[e] the installation or rental of equipment which facilitates
the reception of cable service by hearing impaired individuals.”  As Comcast argues, had
Congress intended to leave local regulators with the authority to “require and regulate” senior
discounts, it would have drafted subsection (e)(1) consistently with subsection (e)(2).  Thus,
the import of Section 623(e)(1) is only that a reasonable senior rate discount, if offered by the
cable operator, must be accepted by the franchising authority.
In further support of its position, Framingham also relies on prior statements of the
Cable Division.  Framingham gives too much meaning to the Cable Division’s recognition that
some operators voluntarily offer senior discounts and that such offers are occasionally made
during license negotiations.  The Cable Division’s statement that the issue of senior discounts
is left to license negotiations was not intended to create a legal right of local franchising
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authorities to require senior discounts as a condition of approving a franchise.  Rather, it was
an observation that there is no federal or state law requirement to provide such a discount, and
that such a term, like many other franchise terms that we address in this Order, may be offered
by the cable operator as a bargained-for term during negotiations.
Moreover, as Harron demonstrates, senior discounts are not eligible for external cost
treatment, but rather are simply discounts from established rates that may not be recovered
from other ratepayers by charging a rate exceeding the maximum permitted rate established
under the FCC’s rules.306  Harron further states that senior citizen discounts are not the kinds
of costs recoverable through a cost-of-service showing.307  The imposition of a senior citizen
discount by an issuing authority would thus reduce a cable operator’s revenues.  It therefore
follows that if a cable operator is to forgo such revenues, it must be voluntary and may not be
imposed by an issuing authority.  Thus, the refusal to offer a senior citizen discount may not
be a factor in denying a license renewal as a matter of law.  Nevertheless, we encourage the
continuation of senior citizen discounts whether offered in the course of license negotiations or
as a separate agreement, and we expect cable operators to honor all agreements to provide such
discounts.
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7. Enforcement Provisions: Performance Bond, Determination of Breach,
and Liquidated Damages (Reason 12); Security Fund (Reason 22)
The RFP required a proposal to provide a performance bond in the amount of
$250,000, a security fund of $30,000, and liquidated damages terms for certain events.308 
Comcast offered to maintain a performance bond of $25,000, but no security fund, and did not
propose liquidated damages language.309  Framingham denied the proposal on the grounds that
Comcast would not agree to provide a performance bond and security fund in the amounts
currently required under the 1999 Renewal License, and did not provide a determination of
breach process and liquidated damages language.310  Except with regard to the issue of a
determination of breach process, neither motion demonstrates a lack of a genuine issue of fact
as to whether or not Comcast’s proposals were reasonable.  We describe the general
weaknesses in both motions below.
Comcast’s arguments with respect to the performance bond and security fund rest
generally on its assertions that no town has ever taken recourse against Comcast under a
performance bond, that Comcast’s performance record is “unblemished,” and that
Framingham has not made Comcast’s performance an issue in the renewal.311  From these
assertions, Comcast apparently calls on the Cable Division to determine that its proposals for
the performance bond and security fund are “reasonable.”  These arguments, however, require
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the Cable Division to weigh Comcast’s performance against the costs of the risk of
nonperformance, an exercise that is entirely unsuited for summary decision.  Comcast did not
establish a lack of a genuine dispute as to the appropriate level of security, nor did Comcast
establish that Framingham will be unable to demonstrate its case.
Framingham provides no factual support for its motion other than the fact that Comcast
has now offered performance bond and security fund amounts significantly less than Comcast’s
predecessors in prior licenses.312  Framingham failed to address why the proposed amounts are
insufficient to cover the risk of default today.  Without proof of the risk of default,
Framingham has identified no basis for the Cable Division to determine that Comcast’s refusal
to meet the RFP terms was unreasonable given the cost to cover that risk.
With regard to liquidated damages, Comcast’s argument that such damages would only
serve to penalize Comcast rather than compensate for actual loss would still require us to
weigh the potential losses against the liquidated damages.  Comcast has not established
sufficient facts for the Cable Division to rule in its favor on summary judgment. 
Framingham’s argument, relying upon 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(2)(D) begs the question whether the
liquidated damages provisions of the 1999 Renewal License are still reasonable and necessary
to meet its cable-related needs.  At best, this provision indicates that the Cable Act
contemplates some level of liquidated damages that is not included in the franchise fee cap, but
Framingham may not rest on this section to establish facts on summary decision regarding
what level of liquidated damages would be reasonable.
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Finally, with respect to the determination of breach procedures, Comcast argues that
Framingham did not ascertain any need for precise remedies and the RFP did not require it to
propose any determination of breach procedures; therefore, Comcast argues, those procedures
should have been subject to negotiation, and it was unreasonable for Framingham to deny its
proposal that the issuing authority “may determine to pursue any lawful remedy available to
it.”313  Framingham states simply that the proposed procedures lacked the specificity of the
language contained in the 1999 Renewal License.314  We find no terms in the RFP mandating
specific determination of breach language.315  Therefore, the parties chose to leave these terms
to negotiation,316 and, as a matter of law, it was improper for Framingham to deny the renewal
on this basis.
8. Reports (Reason 13)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to propose to submit to Framingham certain reports
pertaining to Comcast’s operation of the cable system in Framingham:
including, but not limited to, quarterly complaint reports, quarterly outage
reports, detailed financial reports, performance test reports, quarterly LO
programming logs, telephone reports, construction reports, annual number of
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subscribers, etc. all of said reports must be specific to the Framingham cable
system alone.317
Comcast responded that it would provide financial statements and records of customer
complaints as required by the Cable Division, as well as records required by the FCC to be
maintained for public inspection.318  Framingham cited Comcast’s failure to agree to continue
to provide certain reports that it states are currently required by the 1999 Renewal License as a
ground for denying the renewal proposal.
b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast argues that Framingham failed to introduce evidence to demonstrate that it has
a need for the reports requested, and that it has proposed to provide all reports that the Town
needs to fulfill its duties as a franchising authority.319  Comcast asserts that Framingham’s
reporting requirements would have subjected Comcast to increased costs and diverted resources
away from providing service.320  Framingham counters that the RFP did not request new
reports, but only a continuation of reports previously provided.321  Framingham claims that
Comcast did not provide evidence of any increased costs and that Comcast did not previously
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object to supplying such reports.322  Framingham also counters that the documents are
necessary to ensure compliance with the licensing agreement.323
c. Analysis
Framingham’s motion on this point simply makes bare assertions without any citation to
the record or legal support for its claim of right.  Therefore, Framingham’s motion is denied in
part on this point.  
Comcast’s motion rests on the assertion that Framingham has not demonstrated a need
for the documents requested; but Comcast has not demonstrated a lack of a material issue as to
whether those documents are necessary to ensure compliance with the licensing agreement, or
that Framingham will be unable to demonstrate that need.  That the reports were provided
under previous licenses, however, does not demonstrate that the costs are justified, and
Framingham will have to demonstrate that continued need in this proceeding.  Further, the
mere fact that reporting requirements will subject Comcast to increased costs does not establish
that Comcast is entitled to summary decision, because Comcast must demonstrate that the
increased cost is unreasonable given Framingham’s claimed need for the reports.  This too
remains a question of fact to be tried.  Therefore, Comcast’s motion for summary decision is
denied in part on this point.
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9. Definition of Cable System (Reason 14)
a. Introduction
Comcast proposed to define its “cable system” as follows:
The cable television system owned, constructed, installed, operated and
maintained by Licensee in the Town of Framingham for the provision of
broadband telecommunications services capable of operating as a fully
addressable system of antennas, cables, wires, lines, fiber-optic cables, towers,
wave guides or other conductors, converters, equipment or facilities, designed
to provide telecommunications services, with includes, but is not limited to
distributing video programming and technologies to Subscribers, and/or
producing, receiving, amplifying, storing, processing, or distributing audio,
video, digital or other forms of signals to Subscribers and in accordance with
the terms and conditions in this Renewal License.324
Framingham rejected the proposal on the grounds that “Comcast would not agree to continue
using the federal definition of ‘Cable System’ pursuant to the 1999 Renewal License . . . .”325 
Framingham’s objection was that the proposed definition “would have potentially given
Comcast the right to provide services other than Cable Services, notwithstanding the fact that a
new renewal license would only be a grant to provide Cable Services.”326
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b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast argues that it proposed a definition that accurately describes the Framingham
system, “which is a broadband system that provides video, digital [telephone] and high speed
Internet service to subscribers.”327  Comcast asserts that there is no requirement that cable
licenses must incorporate the federal definition.328  Comcast argues that the federal definition of
“cable system” was enacted before broadband technology had been developed and used in
cable systems, and fails to describe Comcast’s system in Framingham.329  According to
Comcast, because its definition is written accurately to describe the system in Framingham, its
proposed definition of cable system is reasonable.330
Comcast argues that the federal courts have consistently stated that a cable system
operating under a cable television license may provide services other than cable services and
still be considered cable systems under the law.331  Comcast contends that the Cable Act
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contains provisions that prevent local governments from using a cable franchise to prohibit or
regulate any telecommunications services delivered over a cable system.332
Further, Comcast maintains that the RFP did not require Comcast to file a draft renewal
license (in which Comcast proposed the definition), and that the contents of the final license
were to have been “made during negotiations.”333  Comcast states that it was willing to use the
federal definition if Framingham preferred it.334  Comcast argues that the proposal should not
have been rejected on the basis of the proposed definition, because the RFP invited it to
negotiate license provisions.335
Framingham argues that it had the right to require the use of the federal definition of
“cable system,” because federal law prescribes the definition.336  Framingham argues that
Comcast’s proposed definition attempts to include “telecommunications services,” which do
not fall within the definition of cable services as defined by the Cable Act.337  Framingham
suggests that Comcast may not insist upon a definition that gives it the right to provide
telecommunications services when the statutory definition of a cable system does not explicitly
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include telecommunications.338  Framingham contends that the cases cited by Comcast do not
support its argument, but pertain only to the rates that may be assessed under the federal Pole
Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, when video and internet transmissions are commingled on
the same facilities.339
c. Analysis
The RFP did not require a definition of the term “cable system.”  Therefore, the
definition of the term was a matter for negotiation, and it was improper for Framingham to
reject the proposal on the basis of Comcast’s proposed definition.  In any event, because
Comcast concedes that it is willing to use the statutory definition of “cable system” that
Framingham desires, there is no longer a live dispute between the parties.  Accordingly, the
Cable Division denies both motions on this issue as moot.
10. Level Playing Field (Reason 15)
a. Introduction
Comcast proposed a term providing for “level playing field” language: “To the extent
allowed by applicable law(s), the grant of any additional cable television license(s) shall be on
substantially equivalent terms and conditions as those contained in this Renewal License.”340 
Framingham rejected Comcast’s proposal in part on the grounds that the language has no basis
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in applicable state or federal law and would have had a “chilling effect on any new operators
seeking to provide Cable Service in Framingham.”341
b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast argues that the Cable Division as a matter of law should reject Framingham’s
reasons for denial on the basis of the proposed level playing field language.342  Comcast argues
that Framingham’s finding of a chilling effect on market entrants is speculative, and that
Framingham never presented any evidence to support the finding.343  Comcast asserts that, to
the contrary, new market entrants would be encouraged to enter a market with the assurance of
competitive neutrality by an issuing authority.344
Comcast maintains that level playing field language ensures that no other operators
providing service in the municipality receive terms and conditions more favorable than those
provided in the existing license.345  Comcast urges the Cable Division to take notice of the fact
that Comcast currently faces competition from RCN and DBS providers, and that Verizon has
announced plans to construct a new network in parts of Framingham and surrounding
communities.346  Comcast argues that if other providers do not incur the same obligations as
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Comcast, the cost imposed on Comcast would make it difficult to compete economically, and
Comcast could not offer the same level of PEG Access support and other obligations if it must
assume the risks of competition.347  Comcast states that the proposal is consistent with the level
playing field language contained in the existing license and that the same language is in 42 of
the 43 franchises entered into by Comcast in Massachusetts in 2002 and 2003.348   Comcast
argues that the level playing field language is an issue for negotiation and that the RFP was
silent on this issue.349  Comcast contends that a material dispute exists that precludes summary
decision for the Town on this issue, because Framingham refused to allow evidence of
competition in the proceeding before it.350
Framingham asserts that level playing field language would have a negative chilling
effect on new competition.351  Framingham claims that the proposed language would require it
to consider the effects of unlicensed providers over which it has no authority.352  Framingham
asserts that the language was not responsive to Framingham’s “fundamental interest in
encouraging new competition in the Town in order to benefit cable television
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subscribers . . . .”353  Framingham also argues that the language would be contrary to the
intent of the Cable Act, which is to promote cable service competition.354  Framingham
contends that Comcast has a mature and established cable system, in contrast to new providers,
which will have the burden of start-up and installation costs.355  Framingham insists that it is
important for it to have the flexibility to engage freely in negotiations with smaller, less
established providers in order to ensure the growth of cable system competition in
Framingham.356
c. Analysis
As Comcast points out, Framingham failed to mandate terms in its RFP regarding the
level playing field language, even though the term was included in the 1999 Renewal License. 
That is, Framingham failed to identify in its RFP a community need to be free from the
constraints of the level playing field provision.  It was therefore improper as a matter of law
for Framingham to have denied the renewal proposal pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(D)
based on the proposed inclusion of the level playing field language.  Therefore, we deny
Framingham’s motion and grant Comcast’s motion on this point.357
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That is not to say that the level playing field language must be incorporated in the
license as a matter of law, because, as Comcast argues, there is a question of fact whether the
provision is reasonable, which depends among other things on the state of existing competition
and the threat of market entry by other cable operators over the term of a new license.  We
cannot credit Framingham’s assertions of a “chilling effect” on competition, because the
assertions are speculative and unsupported by any evidence.  Having excluded relevant
evidence of competition in the proceedings before it, Framingham could not have made a
finding of fact based on evidence that level playing field language would have had a chilling
effect on competition.  We note that the FCC is currently seeking comments on whether such
terms create an unreasonable barrier to entry or whether they create comparability among
providers.358  The FCC has yet to issue findings on this matter.  In the proceeding before the
Cable Division, Comcast must demonstrate that the level playing field provision is consistent
with the Cable Act and that, given the state of competition in the market, the provision is
reasonable in order for Comcast to be able to meet Framingham’s cable related needs.
11. Ten Year Term (Reason 16)
a. Introduction
With respect to the renewal license term, the RFP stated:
The Board of Selectmen, as statutory Issuing authority, will grant a renewal
license for a term within the range of three (3) to ten (10) years.  To this end,
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Comcast must specify the length of the renewal license term that it is seeking
and must provide the Town with a detailed rationale for such a desired term.
Any renewal proposal, regardless of the length requested, must include, among
other things, Comcast’s detailed (i) cost projections, (ii) capital expenditures and
investment in any upgraded Framingham cable system, (iii) financial
assumptions, and (iv) projected returns during the entire length of the requested
term. The Issuing Authority will determine the length of the renewal license
term, based upon (i) such financial information, (ii) Comcast’s direct investment
into technologies that enhance and expand the Framingham cable system’s
output and channel capacity, and (iii) negotiations with Comcast.359
Comcast proposed a ten year license on the grounds that “[a] ten (10) year period is necessary
in order to amortize the franchise obligations associated with a Renewal License and our
Proposal.  A shorter-term license reduces the amortization period causing upward pressure on
rates and unnecessary increases to franchise-related cost pass-through on customer’s monthly
bills.”360  Framingham rejected the proposal on the grounds (1) that neither state nor federal
law specifies that the renewal term should be ten years, (2) that Comcast did not provide
detailed financial information to support its proposal, and (3) that Framingham “made virtually
no requests for new services in the RFP” that would cause Comcast to need a ten-year term.361
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such costs on subscriber rates are important considerations.”).
b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
As an initial matter, Comcast argues that Framingham cannot reasonably reject the
proposal, because the RFP stated that the term of years would be determined after
negotiations.362  Comcast contends that Framingham failed to meet its commitment to negotiate
the term.363
Comcast argues that it has submitted undisputed evidence to support a ten-year license
term.364  Comcast denies that it failed to provide requested financial information, stating that
the Form 100 pro forma schedules provide all of the cost projections, capital expenditures, and
projected returns demanded by Framingham.365  Comcast claims that it has made a substantial
investment in the Framingham system over a short period of time and that it is entitled to
recover those costs as well as the costs imposed by Framingham in the RFP.366  One of the
purposes of the renewal provision in Section 626 of the Cable Act, Comcast notes, is to
“encourage investments by the cable operator” and “ensure that the investment will not be
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jeopardized at franchise expiration without action on the part of the operator justifying such a
loss of business.”367
Comcast maintains that the RFP would impose new costs.368  Comcast states that cable
bills would increase between $3.94 to $5.24 per month to cover pass-through costs of all of the
requirements of the RFP when amortized over ten years.369  Comcast claims that the
pass-through costs of its own proposal would be $1.50 per month over ten years.370  Comcast
maintains that if those franchise-related costs are amortized over a license term shorter than ten
years, the cost to subscribers will increase even further.371  Comcast claims that undisputed
survey evidence demonstrates that the majority of subscribers within the Framingham franchise
area would not be willing to pay more to support franchise-related costs.372
Comcast contends that Framingham has no evidence to create a dispute of fact, and that
neither George King nor Mark Purple reviewed Comcast’s submitted financial data, financial
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assumptions, cost projections, and projected returns.373  Further, Comcast argues that no one
with an accounting background reviewed Comcast’s proposal.374
(2) Framingham
Framingham argues that under Massachusetts law, a 10-year renewal term is the
maximum term that can be granted, but there is no presumption of a 10-year term.375 
Framingham asserts that “Comcast did not respond to virtually any” of the specific requests for
information contained in the RFP.376  Therefore, Framingham argues, “the Issuing Authority
could make no judgment as to the appropriateness of the term requested by Comcast.”377 
Framingham claims that Comcast has no need to expend substantial new capital, because the
RFP contained no request to rebuild the subscriber network, rebuild the I-Net, or build a new
studio.378  Therefore, Framingham argues, Comcast’s proposed maximum term is not justified
as a matter of law.379
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c. Analysis
There is no genuine dispute that the RFP indicated that the term of the renewal license
would be determined after negotiation of that term between the parties based on financial
statements to be submitted with the proposal.380  Thus, Framingham was obligated by the
RFP’s own terms to review the submitted financial documents and negotiate a term between
three to ten years.  It was improper to reject the proposal on the basis of a proposed term that
was in the range requested in the RFP and explicitly was left for negotiation.
The case in which a proposal failed to meet the requirements of this RFP could have
arisen if Comcast had failed to submit specific supporting documentation that the proposal
“must include.”  Framingham’s representation to the Cable Division that Comcast failed to
provide documentation to support its proposal as required by the RFP is without merit.  A
reasonably diligent review of the Form 100 pro forma schedules submitted should have
revealed to Framingham that the schedules contain cost projections, capital expenditures and
investments in the Framingham system, and projected returns.  The undisputed record evidence
indicates that the persons responsible for evaluating Comcast’s proposal do not recall having
reviewed these forms in any detail.  Framingham, having failed to review the documents
containing the information that it sought, cannot have issued its denial regarding the renewal
term issue based on the evidence.  Therefore, Framingham’s motion with regard to the issue of
the term of the renewal is denied.
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On the other hand, while Comcast has produced testimony that whether its proposal is
ultimately adopted or whether a proposal implementing all of the town’s requests is adopted,
the result will be a rate increase to cover the franchise-related costs that may be passed through
to customers,381 the testimony regarding the pass-through is conclusory.  These statements
alone are insufficient to demonstrate that the pass-through would amount to approximately
$1.50 per month at a minimum according to Comcast’s proposal, or $3.94 to $5.24 per month
according to the RFP.  The Cable Division would require more developed testimony from the
witnesses in arriving at this result, based on the Form 100 data and other available
submissions, in order to verify the billing impact of the increased franchise costs net of
embedded costs.  Thus, we deny Comcast’s motion on the issue of the term of the franchise
renewal.
12. Town Hall Fiber Link (Reason 18)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to “install a direct fiber-link between the Memorial
Building and Comcast’s headend facility” in order “[t]o improve signal quality on the
Governmental Access Channel.”382  Framingham rejected Comcast’s proposal in part because
“Comcast would not agree to construct and install a direct fiber-link between Memorial Hall
(Town Hall) and Comcast’s headend facility.  The Issuing Authority believes that such a direct
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fiber-link would have improved the signal quality on the Government Access channel, to the
benefit of Comcast’s subscribers.”383
b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast contends that the only evidence of signal quality is Comcast’s evidence that the
signal quality on Comcast’s system meets or exceeds FCC signal quality standards.384  Comcast
argues that while Framingham states that potential improvement of its government access
signal quality is a “benefit,” Framingham does not identify it as a cable-related community
need or interest, and therefore, Framingham ignored the applicable standard in rejecting
Comcast’s proposal on this point.385  In contrast, Comcast argues that it has offered undisputed
evidence that 84 percent of Framingham subscribers are satisfied with the picture quality on the
Comcast system, and that 79 percent of Framingham subscribers would not favor an increase
in their monthly cable bills to support the I-Net.386  Comcast urges the Cable Division to
conclude that a similar percentage of subscribers would not be willing to pay for a bill increase
to support an improvement in signal quality for the government access channel.387  Comcast
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maintains that it is undisputed that a fiber link would cost subscribers an additional
$200,000.388
Framingham did not move for summary decision on this issue.  Framingham’s
opposition to Comcast’s motion on this point does not respond with countervailing evidence to
Comcast’s motion.389
c. Analysis
Framingham does not address the ground for Framingham’s denial of the proposal,
which was that Comcast would not agree to construct and install a fiber-link from the Town
Hall to the headend.  Comcast has presented testimony, undisputed by Framingham, that there
is an existing coaxial drop to the Town Hall.390  We do not rely upon Comcast’s citation to
testimony that its system meets or exceeds FCC signal quality standards, because Comcast did
not identify the relevant standards.  Comcast has demonstrated that subscribers are satisfied
with the signal quality of the system, and that the cost of a new fiber link would be $200,000. 
However, Comcast’s motion relies upon an inference that subscribers would be unwilling to
pay for an improvement in signal quality.  We are unable to draw this inference in favor of
Comcast on summary decision.  Therefore, we deny Comcast’s motion in part on this issue.
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13. Expanded Basic Cable and Additional Drops (Reasons 19 and 20)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to provide to all Framingham Public School buildings and
all other public buildings in the town “a free, activated cable drop, outlet and free monthly
Expanded Basic Service to all such public buildings, at the written request of the Town,” and
“to continue providing up to three hundred (300) additional drops and/or outlets in School
buildings, without charge to the Issuing Authority or the School Department.”391  Comcast
proposed to maintain the current level of active drops and outlets and to provide Basic Service
to municipal and other public buildings.392  Comcast also proposed that it would provide one
drop, outlet, and Basic Service to all new municipal and other Town owned and occupied
public buildings which lie along its cable routes in the Town, but that it would not be required
to install an additional drop to any municipal or Town building that already has a free drop or
outlet provided under the prior license.393  Framingham denied the proposal in part on the
grounds that Comcast would not agree to provide Expanded Basic Cable Service and additional
drops and outlets, and that “[t]here was testimony at the ascertainment hearing in support of
the continuation of such additional drops and outlets by Comcast.”394
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b. Positions of the Parties
(1) Comcast
Comcast argues that its proposal to provide free basic service to municipal buildings
more than satisfies its obligation, under G.L. c. 166A, § 5(e), which only requires cable
operators to provide one cable drop and one outlet at no charge to municipal buildings.395 
Therefore, Comcast argues that its proposal was reasonable as a matter of law under the
governing standard.396  Further, Comcast argues that the requirement to provide expanded
basic cable service would force Comcast to retain a specific type of cable programming, and
that franchising authorities cannot dictate program offerings.397  Comcast argues that it needs to
make decisions on programming based on the needs of its customers in a competitive
environment, and that those decisions may involve eliminating or altering existing tiers of
service.398
Comcast highlights the school department’s statement that it “wished” to have
additional outlets as an example of Framingham’s failure to demonstrate that the requirement
was necessary to meet the Town’s needs considering costs.399  Comcast contends that it is not
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required “to respond to every person or group that expresses an interest in any particular
capability or service” when it proposes a renewal of the license.400
Comcast argues that the Cable Division should reject Framingham’s argument that it
may rely on prior licenses to establish need and reasonableness of costs.401  Comcast argues
that the process of Section 626 under the Cable Act was not intended to be a “comparative
process” where a franchisor may deny a renewal due to another party indicating an intent to
provide more, and that “community needs and interests may not be established on the basis of
such alternative proposals.”402  Comcast maintains that the same reasoning applies to a
proposal submitted at an earlier time by a predecessor operator.403
(2) Framingham
Framingham asserts that expanded basic service to all public buildings, and expanded
basic service and additional drops to all public schools are “identified” needs.404  Framingham
argues that because these needs had been required under the 1999 Renewal License, it may
rely on those terms for the proposition that such terms further the needs and interests of the
community and are not unreasonable as to cost.405  Further, Framingham asserts that “[a]s the
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town of Framingham is the largest ‘town’ in Massachusetts, population wise, it was reasonable
for the Town to ascertain that provision of expanded basic service, additional drops and cable
modem service were ongoing ‘local needs’ necessary to serve the Town’s residents.”406
Framingham argues that there is nothing in the law supporting Comcast’s position that
these terms are only negotiable and that it need not offer them.407  Framingham argues that
G.L. c. 166A, § 5(e) mandates that a cable operator provide a cable drop and outlet to public
buildings, but that it is not a statutory prohibition against providing expanded basic service or
additional drops and outlets.408  Framingham contends that Comcast did not provide any
financial analysis to support its failure to address these needs, and therefore, Framingham was
correct to deny renewal on this basis.409
c. Analysis
While Comcast is correct that its proposal meets the requirements of G.L. c. 166A,
§ 5(e) to provide a drop and an outlet to each public building, that is not sufficient alone to
demonstrate that its proposal is “reasonable” as a matter of law under the relevant standard,
47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(D).  The obligation under state law does not preclude the possibility of
requiring additional drops and outlets, or the provision of expanded basic service.  We also are
not convinced that including a term for the provision of expanded basic service in a franchise
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would usurp Comcast’s power to determine the particulars of programming and service tiers. 
The requirement does not dictate any specific programming, nor does it identify broad
categories of programming.  Even if the term were included, the offering under the expanded
basic service tier would remain subject to Comcast’s discretion.  Comcast’s subsequent
decisions to alter or eliminate the expanded basic service tier could not be considered to be
noncompliance with the term requiring provision of expanded basic service.  Rather,
Comcast’s burden in this proceeding is to show that the proposal to provide basic service to
municipal and public buildings is reasonable, given the cost of providing expanded basic
service.
Finally, Comcast has not met its burden on summary decision with respect to either
refuting or showing a lack of proof of community need.  The fact that the school department
used the term “wish” rather than “need” is not determinative of a lack of a need.  And, while
the Cable Division agrees with Comcast that terms required by prior franchise licenses entered
into by the cable operator or its predecessors are not themselves proof of a current community
need or interest, Comcast has not met its burden to show that proof of Framingham’s
cable-related community need for expanded basic service and additional drops will not be
forthcoming in this proceeding.  The Framingham Decision Reason 20 indicated that “[t]here
was testimony at the ascertainment hearing in support of the continuation of such additional
drops and outlets by Comcast.”410  Comcast has not yet demonstrated a lack of such proof; the
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burden did not shift to Framingham to produce countervailing evidence of its need in opposing
Comcast’s motion.  Therefore, we deny Comcast’s motion in part on this issue.
For the same reason, however, we deny Framingham’s motion for summary decision
regarding expanded basic service and additional drops.  We have rejected the argument that
Framingham may rest on the fact that prior licenses may have required expanded basic service
to demonstrate a current community related need that Comcast must meet.  Beyond that,
Framingham’s motion is entirely devoid of evidence on this point.  Framingham failed to
demonstrate any material element of its claim on this point, and therefore, cannot prevail on its
motion.  Thus, we deny Framingham’s motion in part on this issue.
14. Cable Modem Service (Reason 21)
a. Introduction
The RFP required Comcast to provide cable modem service to all public school
buildings in Framingham.411  Comcast refused on the grounds that “[m]odem service is not a
‘cable service’ and therefore is not part of the renewal process.”412  Framingham rejected the
renewal proposal, in part because “Comcast would not agree to continue to provide Cable
Modem Service to all Framingham public school buildings, as required by the 1999 Renewal
License.”413
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b. Positions of the Parties
Comcast argues that Framingham has no authority to regulate cable modem service.414 
Comcast states that both the FCC and the federal courts have agreed that cable modem service
is an interstate “information service,” and not a “cable service.”415  Further, Comcast argues
that the Cable Division has made clear that towns have no power through the cable license
process over this service.416  Therefore, because the town is without authority to regulate cable
modem service, Comcast argues that Reason 21 of the Framingham Decision should be
rejected as a matter of law.417
Just as it argued with respect to expanded basic cable service, Framingham rests on the
fact that the 1999 Renewal License required the provision of free cable modem service to the
schools as proof of the needs and interests of the community and proof that the requirement is
reasonable.418  Framingham responds to Comcast’s motion, arguing that Comcast’s argument
based on the FCC Declaratory Ruling is opposite to the argument that it sets forth for an
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expanded definition of the term “cable system.”419  Framingham also argues that the FCC only
held that cable companies providing broadband internet access did not provide
“telecommunication services” as defined by the Act, “thus exempting them from common
carrier regulation under Title II, without any further comment on Title VI.”420
c. Analysis
There is no merit to Framingham’s representation that the FCC Declaratory Ruling did
not comment on the regulatory classification of cable modem service with respect to Title VI. 
The question of the classification of cable modem service under Title VI was at the heart of
that ruling.421  The FCC ruled that “cable modem service is not a ‘cable service’ under the
definition prescribed by the Act.”422  It is well-settled that cable modem service is not a cable
service.  Comcast has made a sufficient showing as a matter of law that cable modem service is
not a cable-related community need or interest.  Therefore, Comcast’s refusal to offer free
cable modem service may not be a factor in denying renewal of the franchise as a matter of
law.  Thus, we grant Comcast’s motion in part on this issue.  As we have discussed throughout
this order, the fact that the requirement appears in the 1999 Renewal License, while
enforceable under that license, does not demonstrate that Framingham may require the term to
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be included in a subsequent license.  Thus, we deny Framingham’s motion in part on this
issue.
VI. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Because we have found that issues of fact and law remain to be tried in this proceeding,
the Cable Division will establish a procedural schedule for the remainder of this proceeding. 
We direct the parties to confer and submit a proposed procedural schedule providing for
discovery, submission of pre-filed testimony if necessary, and hearings.  The parties shall file a
proposed schedule no later than 30 days after the issuance of this Order.
VII. ORDER
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is
ORDERED: That Comcast’s motion to take administrative notice is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED: That Framingham’s motion to take administrative notice is
DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED: That Framingham’s motion to strike is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED:  That the official record of the administrative proceedings
before the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Framingham in the matter that is the subject of
this proceeding may be entered into the evidence in this proceeding consistent with this order
and by stipulation of the parties; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED:  That Comcast’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is
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FURTHER ORDERED:  That Framingham’s motion for summary decision is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties shall file a proposed procedural schedule
within 30 days of this Order; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED:  That the parties shall comply with all other provisions of this
Order.
By Order of the
Department of Telecommunications and Energy
Cable Television Division
/s/ Alicia C. Matthews
Alicia C. Matthews
Director
